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THE DETERMINANTS OF SHAREHOLDER
VOTING ON STOCK OPTION PLANS
Randall S. Thomas*
Kenneth J. Martin *
Over the past decade, executive compensation has become a con-
troversial topic. Increasingly, corporate boards of directors are
confronted by angry shareholder groups over the size and com-
position of executive pay packages. One of the most important
focal points for these tensions arises when a board asks share-
holders to approve the creation of new stock option plans or to
amend existing plans. This Article seeks to identify the factors
that lead shareholders to support or to oppose stock option
plans. We examine the justifications for the widespread use of
stock options and identify several benefits from stock option
plans as well as criticisms leveled against the methods that
boards have used to implement the plans.
In addition, we conduct an empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of shareholder voting on stock option plans in the 1998
proxy season. We examine the four companies in our sample in
which shareholders defeated the plans, and then we perform a
cross-sectional analysis of voting results. Our principal finding
is that, while shareholders generally vote to approve stock op-
tion plans, shareholders are particularly sensitive to the poten-
tial dilution caused by the plans, whether that dilution is in
terms of total company dilution or individual plan dilution.
Also, we find that several characteristics of the plans, such as
option repricing, payments in restricted stock, and the provision
of loans to executives for the purchase of shares, appear to be
the most significant factors leading to increased shareholder
opposition.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, executive compensation has become a
controversial topic. Increasingly, corporate boards of directors are
confronted by angry shareholder groups about the size and composi-
tion of executive pay packages. Skirmishes between directors and
shareholders surface in a variety of forums, both inside and outside
the boardroom.
One of the most important focal points for these tensions arises
when shareholders are asked by the board to approve the creation of
new stock option plans or the amendment of existing stock option
plans. While these votes once resulted in routine approval of man-
agement proposals with only minimal shareholder dissent, today the
level of shareholder opposition has risen dramatically and the out-
comes of these votes are much less certain. In several prominent in-
stances, shareholders have rejected management-proposed stock op-
tion plans.
This Article seeks to identify the factors that lead shareholders
to support or oppose stock option plans. Our analysis proceeds on
two levels. First, we examine the justifications for the widespread
use of stock options, or pay for performance, to better understand
the theoretical rationale for this component of executive pay. We
identify several benefits from stock option plans, including improved
incentives for managerial performance and the alignment of share-
holders' and managers' interests. Once we have laid out the case in
favor of stock option plans, we discuss some of the criticisms leveled
against the methods that boards have used to implement such
plans.
The remainder of the Article is an empirical analysis of the de-
terminants of shareholder voting on stock option plans. We begin by
briefly reviewing the legal rules that determine when shareholders
must approve stock option plans. We then examine the four compa-
nies from our sample in which shareholders defeated management
proposed stock option plans or amendments in 1998 and try to de-
termine what common threads exist in these cases. Finally, we dis-
sect the voting results for a large sample of stock option plans from
the 1998 proxy season to better understand why shareholders vote
the way they do.
In the empirical portion of the Article, we begin by observing
that shareholders approve an overwhelming percentage of the plans
submitted to them. On balance, we conclude that most shareholders
believe that these plans bring value to the company. The more diffi-
cult question is why we find differing levels of opposition to these
plans.
To address this question, we first use univariate statistical tests
to see what factors appear to negatively influence shareholder votes.
We find that the dilutive effects of the plan, whether the proposal is
for a new plan or an amendment to an existing plan, the breadth of
[Vol. 35
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
participant eligibility, and the strength of firm performance prior to
the shareholder vote all significantly affect the percentage of shares
voted against the plan. Several plan features also appear to affect
the level of shareholder opposition, including whether the plan pro-
vides for the issuance of discount options, the repricing of options,
the acceleration of vesting restrictions, and the issuance of re-
stricted stock. Omnibus plans and evergreen plans seem to gener-
ate statistically significant higher levels of shareholder opposition,
as do plans with change of control provisions and plans where com-
panies provide executives with loans to purchase their shares upon
exercise of their options. Surprisingly, plans with reload provisions
and plans that permit executives to use pyramiding in the purchase
of stock are not treated differently by shareholders from other plans.
We then employ a series of multivariate regression equations to
determine more precisely which of these results are independently
significant. Many of the earlier univariate results are confirmed in
this analysis. Thus, we continue to see that shareholders view in-
creases in dilution as a negative factor in voting on stock option
plans, both in terms of the total dilutive effect of all stock option
plans at a company and the incremental dilutive effect of an indi-
vidual plan. Furthermore, we find that there is a statistically sig-
nificant interactive effect between the total dilutive effect and the
incremental dilutive effect of the plan. We interpret these findings
to mean that shareholders are very concerned about the level of di-
lution created by stock option plans, but that, at low levels of total
company dilution, there are greater levels of negative votes for indi-
vidual plans with significant dilutive effects.
Proposals to add shares to existing stock option plans are met
with greater levels of shareholder resistance than those that propose
the adoption of a new plan, even when the level of dilution from the
two proposals are identical. We hypothesize that shareholders form
expectations about the level of dilution associated with the adoption
of a stock option plan and that these expectations are disappointed
when they are asked to authorize an increase in the number of
shares to be awarded under the plan. This leads to a higher nega-
tive vote on amendments to plans.
Firm performance significantly impacts the level of shareholder
opposition to stock option plans. We find that shareholders are
more likely to support stock option plans at relatively poorly per-
forming firms than at firms that are experiencing better perform-
ance. We interpret this finding to mean that investors are more in-
clined to try to incentivize managers at poorly performing firms to
do better than they are to reward executives at stronger companies
for performing well.
With respect to the features of stock option plans, we continue
to find significant relationships between the level of shareholder op-
position to stock option plans and the presence of option repricing,
the issuance of restricted stock, and the provisions of loans to execu-
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rives to purchase shares when they exercise their options. We fur-
ther find some support for statistically significant positive relation-
ships between the percentage of negative votes on stock option plans
and whether the plan offers discounted options or has evergreen fea-
tures.
Several variables do not have statistically significant effects on
shareholder voting patterns. These include whether the plan is an
omnibus plan, permits the award of reload options, has change of
control provisions, allows for pyramiding of stock options, or has
provisions accelerating options. Furthermore, contrary to the uni-
variate results, we find that, except at technology companies, the
breadth of employee eligibility to receive options has no significant
relationship with the level of shareholder opposition to stock option
plans.
I. UNDERSTANDING STOCK OPTION PLANS
A The Importance of Stock Option Plans
Stock option plans have become an accepted part of corporate
America's pay packages. In a typical incentive stock option plan:
The company gives the executive the right to purchase a cer-
tain number of shares at a stipulated price, called the "strike
price" or "option price," within a designated period of time.
The strike price is higher than the current market value of the
shares when the options are awarded. The concept is to give
the executive an incentive to increase the value of the com-
pany's stock above the strike price.'
The vast majority of plans award options with a strike price equal to
the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of the op-
tion grant.2
Top executives at U.S. corporations receive approximately 50%
of their compensation in the form of stock options.' The value of
these options has increased dramatically in recent years. For exam-
ple, the average value of stock option grants went from $155,000 in
1980 to $1,200,000 in 1994, or, in percentage terms, an increase of
1. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (1993).
2. See KATHY B. RUxToN, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR.,
EXECUTIVE PAY 1998 13 (1999). A small minority of firms give options with a
strike price above the current stock price, so-called "premium" priced options.
See id. Another small group of firms awards "parsops," or performance-
accelerating stock options, where the option vests more quickly if certain goals
are met, such as the stock price increases above a fixed level. See id. at 14.
3. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1076, 1078
(1999) (reporting statistics on a large number of companies for the 1993-97
proxy seasons).
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over 683% in real inflation-adjusted values.4 During this same time
period, the percentage of CEOs holding stock options increased from
30% to almost 70%.r One study of 1189 firms in the S&P Super
1500 using 1998 data calculated that the median realized gain for
corporate leaders exercising stock options was $1,261,460, while the
median future value of CEO option awards was $3,884,740.6
Another revealing statistic is the rapid increase in the number
of mega-grants of stock options, that is, awards initially valued at
more than $10 million, given out by the largest 200 American com-
panies. In 1996, fifty-four CEOs at these 200 companies received a
mega-grant of stock options.8 By 1998, this number had risen to 111
out of 200.9 In other words, the number of mega-grants of stock op-
tions at the largest American companies had doubled since 1996.
As stock option awards increase in size and value, the existing
shareholders of a company face potential dilution of their ownership
stake if the company issues more shares of its stock to satisfy the
exercise of new stock options. When these options are exercised,
4. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bu-
reaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 662 (1998).
5. See id. at 663.
6. See RuxnON, supra note 2, at 3. Realized gains are defined as the ac-
tual amount that CEOs gained by exercising their options in the sample year.
About 40% of CEOs realized gains on their options in 1998. See id. Realized
gains on stock options and other long-term compensation are highly variable
because, even though their value may result from several years' performance,
the reported gain is realized all in one year. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN
ROBERTS, EcONOAICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMfENT 424-25 (1992).
Option award future values are the median value of option awards at the
end of their term, calculated by making assumptions about the rate of apprecia-
tion of the company's stock price. See RUXTON, supra note 2, at 11. An option's
value increases with increases in the underlying stock price. See id. The values
discussed by Ruxton are derived by assuming that stock prices increase 10%
annually. Id.
There are substantial differences in stock option values among the firms by
size. For instance, the median realized option gain for CEOs in the largest
group of firms, the S&P 500, is $2,146,875 (51% of CEOs exercising), and the
option award future value for the same group of executives is $8,404,382. See
id. at 3. By contrast, the same values for the CEOs of the smallest firms in the
sample, those in the S&P 600 SmallCap index, show that the median realized
option gain is $745,043 (32.2% of CEOs exercising), and the median option
award future value is $2,006,243. See id.
Another interesting difference among different sized firms is the degree to
which they distribute stock options more broadly among their employees. Rux-
ton found that the average option award to CEOs in 1998 constituted 14.2% of
all stock options awarded in the 1189 firms in her sample. Id. at 12. The larg-
est firms in this sample, those in the S&P 500, tended to spread their stock op-
tion grants among a larger group of employees than the smaller companies. See
id.
7. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Your Career Matters: The Jungle, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at B18.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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existing shareholders will have a smaller claim on the company's as-
sets and property. This dilutive effect has three parts: lower per
share earnings, less voting power, and a shift in the allocation of
stock price gains. The first impact is easily understood: more shares
dividing up a fixed pot of earnings leads to a reduction in the
amount of earnings per share. The second effect, reduced voting
power, is a bit more subtle. If managers exercise stock options to in-
crease their stake in the company, then they may be able to short-
circuit the market for corporate control. For example, if a company
has a supermajority voting provision for engaging in extraordinary
corporate transactions, such as mergers, and management already
owns a substantial amount of the company's stock, the board's deci-
sion to award a mega-grant of stock options may effectively give
management a blocking position over all mergers.
The third effect of dilution is that existing shareholders give up
a portion of the gains they would otherwise realize from increases in
the company's stock price. This occurs because, as the company's
stock price increases, option holders will choose to exercise their op-
tions to capture the increase in option value over the exercise price.
As more shares are issued to cover these options, the increased sup-
ply of stock in the market will lower the price of all shares.
Dilution can be calculated in a variety of different manners.0
The most accurate measure is total company dilution because it
"provides an understanding of the dilution caused by all company-
sponsored programs."1 This measure looks at all of the company's
plans and counts all shares that are proposed in the plan being
voted on plus any proposed, available, or outstanding shares in all
other plans. 2 Most institutional shareholders use total company
dilution as their principal measure for evaluating the dilutive effects
of stock option plans.13
10. See DREw HAMBLY & ALESANDRA. MONACO, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY
RESEARCH CTR., POTENTIAL DILUTION 1998 (1999); KATHY B. RUXTON, INVESTOR
RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS ON ExEcuTivE
CON[PENSATION PLANS 17 (1999). Ruxton noted:
Dilution may be evaluated four ways: (1) by only the proposed shares;
(2) by the proposed plan, including the proposed shares and any avail-
able or outstanding shares under the plan; (3) by total plans, includ-
ing proposed, available and outstanding shares under all company
plans; or (4) by per-year dilution represented by the proposed shares
divided by the plan length.
RUXTON, supra, at 17.
11. RUXTON, supra note 10, at 17. The statistical computations of total
company dilution are explained infra Part IV.
12. The difficulty with this measure is that it requires examining the foot-
notes of the company's financial statements to compile the information needed
to calculate it.
13. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 18 (stating that, in a 1996 survey, the
Investor Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") found that 30% of the sur-
veyed institutions had guidelines mandating a negative vote for stock option
plans if the total company dilution measure exceeded 10%, while virtually all of
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The dramatic increase in the value of stock option compensation
and its effect on other shareholders has focused increasing attention
on the underlying benefits and costs of stock options. In the next
section, we explore the theoretical justifications for stock options
and some of their problems.
B. What Are the Purposes of (and Problems with) Stock Option
Plans?
Companies offer three main justifications for stock option plans:
first, they can be used to attract or retain highly qualified managers
and employees; second, they incentivize managers and employees to
perform better; and third, they help align the interests of managers
and employees with those of the stockholders of the company."
With regard to the first justification, many companies use stock op-
tion plans to recruit and keep talented executives and employees. 5
Stock option plans allow small companies to compete with the larger
public corporations in hiring and keeping talented individuals that
they might not otherwise be able to afford.16 Furthermore, stock op-
tion plans are an attractive form of compensation for companies be-
cause of their favorable accounting treatment 7 and preferred tax
status.'8
Stock options are frequently justified on a second basis: that
they represent "pay for performance," that is, that they base an ex-
the remaining institutions would consider voting against such plans). However,
some shareholders disregard dilution measures because they believe that the
company can use the money that executives pay for these shares for productive
purposes. See id. The same cannot be said about awards of restricted stock or
discounted options because executives pay little or nothing for these shares.
See id.
14. For further discussion of these goals, see Randall S. Thomas, Is Execu-
tive Compensation Too High: Economists' Justifications, Lawyers' Critiques and
the Importance of Maximizing Team Production 26-51 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished
working paper, on file with the authors). Compare Michael W. Melton, The Al-
chemy of Incentive Stock Options-Turning Employee Income into Gold, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 500-01 (1983), which describes Congress' goals in creat-
ing Incentive Stock Options.
15. See Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A
Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 31, 39 (1997); Melton, supra note 14, at 509.
16. See Clawson & Klein, supra note 15, at 39. For example, Silicon Valley
start-up companies do not have the capital or borrowing power to attract expe-
rienced and talented executives from the larger corporations. See id. Yet, the
high growth potential of these companies makes their equity securities very at-
tractive. See id.
17. See Thomas, supra note 14, at 144. Under existing accounting rules,
these options can be issued without charging anything to the company's earn-
ings. See id.
18. See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 7 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 301, 308 (1995) (noting that options
"provide more flexibility and discretion than other forms of performance-based
compensation" for tax purposes).
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ecutive's remuneration on her company's increase in value.19 Stock
options may improve executives' and employees' performance be-
cause the options' value depends on the company's stock price ex-
ceeding the exercise price of the option." Executives and other em-
ployees have financial incentives to work to get stock prices up. The
clearer the link between the company's stock price and the execu-
tives' or employees' performance, the greater the incentive effects
(and the more justified the rewards).2 In other words, pay for per-
formance is a way of incentivizing managers to work harder to in-
crease firm value by giving them a share of any gains that they help
to create. In recent years, institutional investors have advocated the
use of pay for performance on these grounds.22
Finally, stock option plans provide managers and employees
with a proprietary interest in the company.23 By doing so, stock op-
tions help align managers' interests with those of shareholders.
4
Stock-based pay, therefore, is claimed to be superior to more fixed
components of compensation, such as salary and bonuses, because it
rewards managers for thinking like shareholders.25
Stock options can be used to get managers to take more (justi-
fied) risks.26 To understand this point, consider the following. Man-
19. Id. at 306 (stating that stock options have been approved by Congress
as performance-based compensation). In theory, boards could use changes in
salary and bonuses to incentivize managers to perform better. However, under
current conditions, it seems very unlikely that this will occur. See Brian J.
Hall, A Better Way to Pay CEOs?, in ExEcUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 35, 42 (Jennifer N. Carpenter &
David L. Yermack eds., 1999). Political pressures will prevent boards from
awarding huge bonus payments that are likely to attract criticism from the me-
dia and shareholders, whereas friendly boards are unlikely to cut executive pay
sharply when things go poorly. See id.
20. See Bank, supra note 18, at 306.
21. But see Clawson & Klein, supra note 15, at 33 (arguing that this as-
sumption is wrong).
22. See James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institu-
tional Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 758 (1995).
23. See Melton, supra note 14, at 502-03.
24. See EDWARD LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 122 (1997);
Hall, supra note 19, at 36; see also Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation,
in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOAICS 2485, 2510 (Orley Ashenfelter & David
Card eds., 1999) (discussing the incentive implications of stock options).
25. A related idea is that executives and directors should have long-term
equity interests in their companies so as to better align their incentives with
those of shareholders. Some scholars have argued that reform efforts should
focus on getting officers to hold large amounts of equity, in the form of re-
stricted stock not capable of transfer, for long periods of time. See Joshua A.
Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts to
Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 172-73 (1995) ("[Elxecutives
should be required to ride the corporate enterprise's roller coaster of fortune.").
26. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 2510 n.29 (citing D. Hirshliefer & R.
Sub, Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice, 2 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 308
(1992)).
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agers and shareholders exhibit different degrees of risk aversion.
Managers are heavily invested in the corporations that they manage
with their jobs and salaries at risk if the corporations become insol-
vent.27 Executive salaries are a fixed claim against the corporation
whose value declines if the firm's value fluctuates substantially.
Furthermore, the value of a manager's human capital may decline if
her company takes risks that do not payoff.28 The success or failure
of a project proposed by an executive will reflect on how that execu-
tive is perceived within the company and by outsiders.29 Bad out-
comes will hurt the executive's future earnings.0 These factors lead
managers to be risk-averse in their corporate decision-making be-
cause they have little to gain if the company does well and much to
lose if it does poorly.
By contrast, diversified shareholders are more inclined to have
the corporation undertake riskier projects with higher returns. By
holding a portfolio of stocks from different companies, they can
eliminate the risk that any one company's performance will have too
dramatic an effect on their investments as a whole.31 Thus, share-
holders are less risk-averse than managers with respect to the fu-
ture of any particular corporation whose stock they hold.
A compensation plan needs to include provisions that give man-
agers incentives to undertake risky, high return projects that maxi-
mize expected firm value."2 The expected value of stock options rises
27. In other words, managers are undiversified because both their human
capital and financial capital are invested largely in their own companies. For
this reason, and the fact that they are often restricted in their exercise or sale of
the options, company executives will place a lower value on stock options than
other investors would. See id at 2511. These effects will be mitigated or offset
by managers' access to superior information about the company's future pros-
pects, which may allow them to time their exercise of the options. See id. at
2511 n.30 (citing David L. Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards
and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997)).
28. See MiLGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 430.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 429 & n.14. In large public corporations, with large numbers
of shareholders who can spread their risks widely, shareholders may be effec-
tively risk neutral. See id.
32. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of
Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AusrL. J. MGMxT. 139, 147 (1982).
The difference in the relative risk aversion of managers and shareholders
creates a tradeoff between risk sharing and incentive pay. Optimal risk alloca-
tion principles argue in favor of putting risks on the party that is least risk-
averse, as that party will demand less of a risk premium for bearing those risks.
If managers are more risk-averse than shareholders, then the risks associated
with non-manager induced changes in the company's stock price should be
placed on the shareholders and not on the managers, as managers will demand
an extra premium for bearing those risks. Thus, risk allocation principles call
for the elimination of performance incentives from executive pay. In other
words, "[play for performance, when the performance measure is noisy, inevita-
bly imposes an inefficient level of risk on management. The risk premium that
2000]
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with the volatility of the underlying stock's price.' 3 Managers that
receive option grants, therefore, have incentives to undertake busi-
ness projects that increase the volatility of the company's asset val-
ues.34 An appropriately designed compensation package will pay ex-
ecutives a relatively fixed salary plus a sufficiently large amount of
stock options to offset their inclinations to be too risk-averse.3
Stock options have the additional advantage of rewarding suc-
cess and not penalizing failure. This asymmetrical payoff structure
"helps to offset the greater weight that risk-averse managers give to
the decrease in the value of their human capital that follows a fail-
ure than they give to the increase that follows success and that thus
leads them not to want to take risks."3' Again, such a payoff struc-
ture encourages managers to implement risky projects that share-
holders would want them to undertake.
Despite these sound theoretical justifications, the critics of pay
for performance have become more numerous in the past few years.
Accepting the idea that giving executives stock interests in the com-
pany will incentivize them to work harder to improve the company
does not end the debate over the appropriate level of their compen-
sation. Even if managers' pay should be tied to increases in stock
prices during the relevant time period, and these increases can be
attributed to the efforts of the managers, "the question is still open
as to what portion of that additional wealth should be paid to the
CEO."37 Thus, even if the theory of pay for performance is accepted,
this only marks the beginning of the inquiry.
Several crucial questions about incentive pay remain unan-
swered. For example, if an executive is highly motivated by $1 mil-
lion in stock options, then will she be more motivated and work
harder if the board awards her $2 million in stock options? If so,
will the improvement in performance be worth the additional cost?
Do executives (or boards) even understand the incentives provided
executives must be paid to bear that risk is the price of pay for performance sys-
tems." Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance:
An Academic Perspective, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
666 (PLI 1992).
33. See Smith & Watts, supra note 32, at 147.
34. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 2510 (citing studies that discuss the re-
lationship between stock options and business projects that increase the vola-
tility of the company's asset values).
35. See Smith & Watts, supra note 32, at 147-48. In order to preserve the
incentive features of the compensation package, the board may need to restrict
the executive from cashing in the stock options through the use of longer vest-
ing periods. See Hall, supra note 19, at 45. Also, the board may wish to stop
the executive from selling off all of her stock by establishing guidelines or goals
about how much of the company's stock an executive must own. See id.
36. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 431.
37. Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 206 (1996).
[Vol. 35
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by stock options?" In order to understand the incentives generated
by stock options, executives must understand how different actions
and events affect the value of their options. Valuing a stock option
requires using the Black-Scholes formula and is not an intuitive
process.
How do the executive's incentives change over time? Will the
board of directors need to give her higher levels of stock options next
year in order to maintain her incentives at that time? Or do execu-
tives develop the habit of working hard to grow the company, so that
they will keep working hard no matter what the pay? Do social
comparisons matter, so that if executives at one company get pay in-
creases, while those at a second company do not, the latter's efforts
decrease? If so, this suggests that the absolute level of pay may be
less important than relative pay levels.
On a more practical level, a lack of correlation frequently exists
between pay and performance. For example, CEO pay increased an
average of 9.4% in 1991, while their companies' corporate profits de-
clined 7% and median stock prices fell 7.7% . 0 In a similar vein,
CEO compensation in the 1980s increased 212%, while earnings per
share rose only 78%."' These statistics illustrate how the rhetoric of
pay for performance may not correspond to reality.
There are also many design problems in pay for performance
contracts. Many so-called performance-based compensation pack-
ages do not base remuneration on the actual performance of the ex-
ecutive or the corporation.42 Instead, pay is based on economic indi-
cators, which may not accurately reflect how an executive is
performing. For example, stock price increases may be caused by
market fluctuations and not by the efforts of a company's manage-
ment.43
Existing types of pay for performance compensation packages
may not appropriately align an executive's pay with her company's
performance from the shareholders' perspective. To understand this
point, it is first necessary to explain a bit about the valuation of
stock options. Under current practices, CEOs are typically awarded
stock options with a ten year duration and an exercise price equal to
the current stock price for the company's common stock ("at the
money" options)." The value of these options is sensitive to the price
38. See Hall, supra note 19, at 39.
39. See id. Hall suggested that boards ought to adopt the practice of "scor-
ing," or valuing, their executives' stock options each quarter so that the execu-
tives and boards can better understand how the value of these options changes
with the stock market. Id. at 44.
40. See Bogus, supra note 1, at 7.
41. See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Ap-
proach to Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 60 (1992).
42. See id. at 66.
43. See id.
44. See Hall, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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of the company's stock, but the value of one option is less than the
value of one share of the company's stock." Thus, for the same ex
ante value transfer, the board of directors can award an executive a
larger number of stock options than stock shares.46 Awarding stock
options rather than stock will greatly increase the pay to perform-
ance sensitivity of the executive's pay because of the leverage effect
of stock options.
However, the sensitivity of pay to performance could be further
increased by awarding "out of the money" options or indexed op-
tions.48 Out of the money options are even more sensitive to changes
in the company's stock price than at the money options.49 This
means that a board can award even more out of the money options
than it can at the money options to achieve the same ex ante value.
The leverage effect of out of the money options will be greater than
that of at the money options. 0 Similar logic applies to the use of in-
dexed options rather than at the money optionsr"
Shareholders would much prefer that boards award CEOs out of
the money or indexed options than at the money options, because
they "raise the hurdle" for CEOs. 2 The out of the money option
forces the CEO to raise the stock price by substantially more than
its current level in order for the option to have value when it is exer-
cised. The indexed option requires the company to beat the stock
45. If the value of the common stock changes, then the value of the stock
option changes, too. The amount of the change that occurs is the option's delta.
An option's delta, that is the change in the value of the option for a derivative
change in the stock's price, is less than one.
46. See Hall, supra note 19, at 40. In the example that Hall used, the board
could award three times as many stock options as shares of stock for the same
ex ante value transfer. Id.
47. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the additional leverage created by
stock options is with an example. Hall compared the value of a one million
share transfer where the stock was trading at $1.00 per share with the value of
an equivalent value (ex ante) transfer of three times as many stock options. Id.
If the company's stock price rose from $1.00 per share to $1.25 per share, he
calculated that the value of the stock would rise by $0.25 million, whereas the
value of the options would increase by $0.43 million. See id.
48. See id. at 43.
49. In other words, out of the money options have a lower delta than at the
money options.
50. The intuition is that the board can award more of the lower valued, out
of the money stock options than at the money options for the same ex ante
value. If the company's stock price increases, the value of the out of the money
options increases more than the value of the at the money options. See Hall,
supra note 19, at 42.
51. Indexed options have exercise prices that rise with a market index
change. See id. at 43. Executives only make money on indexed options if the
company's stock price rises by more than the market index. See id. Each option
is therefore worth substantially less than at the money options, and, as a result,
the board can award more of them for the same ex ante value. The net effect is
to increase the sensitivity of executive pay to company performance. See id.
52. See id.
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market before there is any payoff to the CEO. 3 In fact, these types
of options are rarely used today.54
Stock option repricing is another point of shareholder concern."
Companies claim that stock options lose their incentive value if the
stock price falls far enough below the exercise price that there is lit-
tle chance the executive will exercise the option. Thus, they claim
that the incentive effects of this form of compensation no longer ex-
ist. To restore these incentives, companies drop the exercise price of
these existing options to the current level of their stock price,
thereby "repricing" them.
Shareholder critics claim that option repricing is an egregious
abuse of their rights." These investors argue that the alignment of
shareholder and management incentives only exists if executives are
unrewarded when stock prices fail to rise or fall.5" Shareholders fur-
ther complain that they do not enjoy similar treatment for their
53. See id. at 43-44.
54. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 2508-09 (stating that 95% of stock op-
tions granted today are at the money options, while only 1.5% of options were at
above market prices and only one company granted indexed options). Murphy
found the absence of indexed options and other relative performance measures
in executive compensation to be "a puzzle worth understanding." Id. at 2539.
55. See RUxTON, supra note 2, at 18; Paul M. Sherer & Barbara Tierney,
Shareholders Block General Datacomm from Reducing Employee Options Price,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1999, at A10.
Ruxton found that, out of the 1189 firms in the S&P Super 1500 covered in
her study, only 36 firms, or 3%, repriced stock options in 1998. RUXTON, supra
note 2, at 18. Most of these firms were in the Technology Sector, with 20 of the
36 firms being from that industry group. See id. Most technology firms are in
the S&P 600 SmallCap index. While these numbers are fairly low, Ruxton
pointed out that the practice could become much more widespread if there were
a sustained decline in the stock markets. Id. at 19.
56. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 176 (1991); Charles M.
Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92
COLUm. L. REv. 1867, 1880 (1992). With repricing, no downside risk exists for
an executive whose salary purportedly depends on his company's performance.
See Kreinberg, supra note 25, at 151 ("Revaluation allows directors to remove
effectively the downside risk of performance pay while maintaining some sem-
blance of a competitive compensation."). However, under Treasury Department
regulations, stock options that have been revalued will not be classified as per-
formance-based compensation for purposes of the deductibility limit:
[If the amount of compensation the employee will receive under the
grant or award is not based solely on an increase in the value of the
stock after the date of grant or award (e.g., in the case of restricted
stock, or an option that is granted with an exercise price that is less
than the fair market value of the stock as of the date of the grant),
none of the compensation attributable to the grant or award is quali-
fied performance-based compensation ....
Treas. Reg. § 162.27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (as amended in 1995); see also Bank, supra note
18, at 307 (stating that the amount of compensation must be based only on a
rise in the value of the stock).
57. See CRYSTAL, supra note 56, at 216.
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stock when the price of the company's shares falls.!8
Stock option compensation may lead managers to manipulate
earnings or other accounting figures so as to insure that the com-
pany meets or exceeds analysts' expectations and that the com-
pany's stock price rises. 9 Executives holding options also have a
tendency to avoid dividends and engage in share repurchases." This
raises important questions about whether managers are running the
company to increase the value of their stock options or to raise the
value of the common stock held by the shareholders."' This issue
may be critical at certain times in the corporation's life cycle, such
as when deciding to take the company public. Managers may bring
the company to market too quickly in order to realize immediate
value for their stock options.
Numerous other criticisms have been levied against pay for per-
formance. These complaints include: many performance-based com-
pensation packages use inadequate accounting indicators to meas-
ure the company's performance,62 pay for performance packages
based on attaining economic performance measures may lead man-
agers to engage in unethical behavior to insure that the company
meets performance goals,63 and the derivatives market can be used
58. A related practice is called the reload option. "Reload provisions issue
new options to replace shares sold to pay the exercise price of exercised options.
The new options are granted at fair market value with a term equal to the re-
maining term on the option exercised." Murphy, supra note 24, at 2508 n.27.
This gives executives a "heads I win, tails we start over" deal. American Law
Institute's Principles Widely Accepted by Boards, Courts, 67 U.S.L.W. 2105,
2106 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1998) (quoting John C. Coffee Jr., Columbia University
School of Law).
59. See Kreinberg, supra note 25, at 152 ("[Elxtreme short-run stock price
can be manipulated through the disclosure or delay of disclosure of certain bits
of information that do not rise to the level of materiality necessary for securities
law violations."); Loewenstein, supra note 37, at 208; see also Paul Healy, The
Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Disclosure, 7 J. AccT. & ECON. 85, 106
(1985) (finding that management selected accounting procedures in a manner
that maximized the value of its bonus awards).
60. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 2510 (citing studies that examine the
relationship between stock options and dividends).
61. One commentator has suggested that option-based compensation for
executives, combined with the fact that they are unable to diversify their in-
vestments, has made managers the real owners of the companies that they run.
See Richard A. Booth, It's Bosses, Not Shareholders, Who Own the Company,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A22.
62. See Kreinberg, supra note 25, at 150. For example, using return on eq-
uity as an indicator can lead to management "subtly manipulating" various dis-
cretionary responsibilities to award themselves higher compensation without
providing any long-term benefit to the company. Id. at 152. Thus, shareholders
may be lulled into a false sense of security by compensation classified as per-
formance-based and will be less likely to investigate pay practices.
63. See id. at 153 ("If an individual's pay hinges upon the attainment of a
certain economic indicator, he may be willing to allow questionable practices to
occur in order to reach the indicator.").
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by executives to trade stock options for fixed payment streams based
on factors other than the company's performance.64
Many companies argue that the alleged "abuses" are necessary
parts of incentive pay. Option repricing, for example, is claimed to
be needed to insure that managers continue to have incentives to
perform even if their company's stock price drops after the grant of
their original options.65 This is particularly important, companies
64. Bank asserted that the real problem with stock-based compensation is
that the derivatives market can be used to circumvent the goals of perform-
ance-based compensation. Bank, supra note 18, at 314. According to Bank, the
"explosion" of the derivatives market in recent years, combined with the recent
innovative applications of it, may have become "the single biggest threat to the
notion that stock-based executive compensation will better align pay with per-
formance." Id. One common way that executives use the derivatives market is
by employing an "equity swap." Id. at 318. An equity swap is a type of deriva-
tive contract in which the holder of the stock pays a second party the stock's
dividends for a certain period of time and also pays the second party the net
gain in the stock's value at the end of that period. See id. In return, the second
party agrees to pay the owner of the stock the income from a diversified invest-
ment based upon the value of the stock and will also pay for any loss in value to
the stock at the end of the specified period. See id. Unexercised stock options
can also be sold in the derivatives market. See id. at 322 ("Even a plain vanilla
sale of an executive stock option can yield a greater return than the simple dif-
ference between the stock price and the exercise price.").
By employing the derivatives market, executives not only can collect a sal-
ary that qualifies as performance-based for purposes of corporate tax deduction,
but one which also allows them to avoid the risk of owning the company's stock.
See id. at 318 (stating that investors can change the risk profile of their portfo-
lio by using derivatives such as equity swaps). In addition to avoiding risk, ex-
ecutives also avoid the capital gains tax (since the stock is not sold) and still re-
tain voting power in the company. See id. at 319-20.
Bank pointed out three further areas of executive compensation where the
derivatives market creates problems. Id. at 323-29. First, use of the deriva-
tives market leads to a situation where an executive's compensation is not
based at all on his or her company's performance, which is what stock-based
compensation was designed to do. See id. at 324. What is worse, some equity
swaps can be designed so that an executive's compensation is dependent on the
failure of his or her own company or on the success of a competitor. See id.
Also, Bank pointed out that shareholders may be fooled into thinking that the
executive's pay is linked to performance because he or she still owns and votes
the stock. Id. at 324-25 (noting that the SEC disclosure requirements may not
alleviate this problem).
Another basic problem of the derivatives market in issues of executive
compensation is that it makes valuation difficult. See id. at 326 (noting the dif-
ficulty of valuing compensation when the derivatives market is used). Bank
noted that "by pushing executives further into strategies of financial innova-
tion, executive compensation reform may be driving the true value of pay pack-
ages underground." Id.
A fourth problem that Bank pointed out was that the derivatives market
allows executives to be taxed on a contingent basis when, in reality, they are
receiving a fixed income. Id. at 327. As a result, the executive gets "the secu-
rity of a fixed-return asset with the deferred tax payments of a contingent-
return asset." Id. at 328.
65. See id. at 320.
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say, where the decline in stock prices is caused by economic factors
beyond executives' control."
Other criticisms can be addressed through an appropriately de-
signed pay for performance package. For instance, the criticism that
stock options may reward executives even though the rise in the
stock's price was due to market factors can be taken care of by using
an indexed option. 7 Critics' concerns that management will ma-
nipulate the short-term price of the company's stock can be over-
come by requiring executives to hold their stock for longer periods of
time.68 Stock options can be made to have a downside risk for execu-
tives by using a "purchased stock option."69 Finally, the government
could prohibit executives from using derivative instruments as a
way of realizing immediate value on their stock options."0
II. SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON STOCK OPTION PLANS
Until a few years ago, most, if not all, companies' stock option
plans had to be approved by their shareholders.": As boards of direc-
tors awarded ever-larger numbers of stock options, shareholder re-
sistance to approving these plans increased substantially. One
study found that:
Where once there was an assumption that any plan presented
by management and directors for approval would receive no
more than token 3% to 5% disapproval, the 1995 and 1996
proxy seasons saw significantly stronger shareholder resis-
tance to these plans, as votes against stock option plans in the
66. See id.
67. See id. at 312. An indexed option is one where "the exercise price of the
option is adjusted to the price movements of a designated index such as the
Standard & Poor's 500 or to an index more narrowly tailored to the company's
industry group." Id.; see also Clawson & Klein, supra note 15, at 47 ("[T]he
most rational stock option plan structure is to adjust the exercise price of the
stock option up or down, depending upon the performance of a company's stock
relative to a market index, an industry index, or some combination of both.").
68. See Bank, supra note 18, at 313. To do this, a company can use what is
known as a "deposit share option program," which requires executives to deposit
shares that they already own with the company in return for an option grant.
Id.
69. Id. A purchased stock option is simply an option that requires the ex-
ecutive to pay a significant amount of money before it is granted, thus resulting
in a real loss if the price of the stock falls below the exercise price. See id.
70. See id. at 330 (noting that the SEC now requires insiders to disclose
their participation in equity swaps). The SEC has issued some regulations con-
cerning the use of equity swaps. See id. However, Bank is skeptical that such
regulations will be successful in preventing new derivative instruments from
being created to replace equity swaps. Id.
71. See Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments
in Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns
for Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 5, 5 (1997).
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range of 20-40% become more commonplace. 72
While only three companies' proposals were defeated in that time
period, another twenty-eight proposals received negative votes of
40% or more. 3 More recent data for stock option plans put up for
votes between July 1997 to June 1998 show that fifteen plans were
defeated out of the more than 2000 plans proposed.74 These defeated
plans would have potentially increased the dilution of existing
shareholders by between 8% and 33%.!5
In recent years, several little-noticed changes in Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and stock exchange regulations have
chipped away at the requirement that stock option plans be ap-
proved by shareholders. Prior to 1996, Rule 16b-3 required share-
holder approval of employee benefit plans that were to be exempt
from Section 16(b), the short swing prohibition for corporate insid-
ers.7 6 In 1996, the SEC reformulated the rule so that exempt plans
need only be approved by the board of directors, a disinterested
committee of the board of directors, or the shareholders. Many
companies choose one of the new alternative director approval
routes.
By itself, this change did not alter the need for shareholder ap-
proval of most stock option plans. Shareholder approval for many
stock option plans still was necessary for several other independent
reasons. First, a few important corporate codes require shareholder
approval of stock option plans, 8 and all states mandate shareholder
approval if the corporate charter must be amended to increase the
number of authorized shares of stock for a stock option plan.79
Second, the federal tax code provides companies with tax bene-
fits for certain types of shareholder-approved stock option plans."
72. Id. at 10.
73. See id. at 10-11, 29 tbl.5.
74. See Joann S. Lublin & Leslie Scism, In New York: Stock-Option Plans
Breed Resentment Among Investors, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 12, 1999, at 5B (cit-
ing Richard Wagner, president of Strategic Compensation Research Associates).
Furthermore, those plans that were approved frequently had high percentages
of votes against them. See id.
75. See id.
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b)(1)-(2) (1995) (amended 1996). Before 1996,
Rule 16b-3 stated that an employee benefit plan was exempt from Section 16(b)
if it had been approved "[bjy the affirmative votes of the holders of a majority of
the securities" or by their written consent. Id.; see also Wagner & Wagner, su-
pra note 71, at 11-12 (discussing the effects of the SEC's reformulation of Rule
16b-3).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(1)-(2) (1999).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 505(d) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (stating
that "[tihe issue of... rights or options to one or more directors, officers or em-
ployees of the corporation... shall be authorized by a majority of the votes cast
at a meeting of shareholders"); see also Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 13
(discussing the treatment of option plans under various state laws).
79. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 13-14.
80. See id. at 14-15.
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Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") allows compa-
nies to deduct executive compensation in excess of $1 million if it is
paid out under the terms of a performance-based stock option plan.81
The IRC's definition of performance-based plans requires that they
be approved by shareholders.82
Finally, all national stock exchanges have rules requiring
shareholder approval of many stock option plans.3 However, the
SRO requirements have been under attack. For example, until
1998, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") required that listed
companies seek shareholder approval for virtually all stock option
plans that were not "broadly based."' In January 1998, however,
the NYSE sought SEC approval to expand the types of option plans
that were exempt from shareholder approval." One of the proposals
expanded the definition of broad-based plans and created a non-
exclusive "safe harbor" for those plans in which 20% of the com-
pany's employees, half of whom must be neither officers nor direc-
tors, are eligible to participate.86 Plans falling within the safe har-
bor would not require shareholder approval. The SEC received no
comments on the proposed rule changes and approved them on April
8, 1998.8
81. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (1994).
Incentive stock options ("ISOs") are a second type of stock option plan that
is tax advantaged but requires shareholder approval. See Wagner & Wagner,
supra note 71, at 15. ISOs create no taxable income for employees when they
exercise the option and purchase the stock. See id. Furthermore, if the em-
ployee holds the stock for a minimum of one year, there is no taxable gain to the
employee until she sells the underlying stock. See id. However, ISO plans are
used primarily for lower or middle level corporate employees because their
awards are limited to a maximum value of $100,000. See id.
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii) (1994). It is possible that stock option
plans directed solely to officers and directors who are not "covered individuals"
under the IRC's definition could be considered performance-based, but this
would require excluding the company's CEO and four other highest paid indi-
viduals. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 14.
83. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 12-13.
84. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
39659, available in 1998 WL 63612, at *1 (Feb. 12, 1998). The one exception
was for plans designed to induce someone not previously employed with the
company to join the firm. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at *2. In addition, the proposal stated that, when deciding if a
plan is broad-based, a variety of factors would be examined, such as the number
of people covered by the plan and the nature of the employees. See id. Another
significant proposed change was that non-broad-based plans that dilute share-
holder equity less than 5% would no longer require shareholder approval. See
id.
87. See id.
88. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to Pro-
posed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-39839, available in 1998 WL 164369, at *1, *4 (Apr. 8, 1998). In
granting approval to the changes, the Commission stated that "the changes
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The adoption of the rule changes triggered an uproar among in-
stitutional investors. They objected that companies could easily de-
sign option plans under them which would not need shareholder ap-
proval. 9 In response to these objections, the NYSE established a
task force to study the question.9' At the recommendation of the
task force, the NYSE again proposed changes to the shareholder ap-
proval rules in October 1998.91 Under the new proposals, an option
plan is classified as "broadly-based" if a majority of the company's
full-time, exempt employees in the United States are eligible to par-
ticipate in it and if, within the shorter of three years or the term of
the plan, a majority of the shares awarded under the plan go to em-
ployees who are not officers or directors. 2
A number of large institutional investors objected to the revised
proposals.93 On December 28, 1998, the SEC extended the period in
which it would receive comments on the new proposal.94 Thus, as of
this writing, the "20%" rule remains intact.
Even where there is no need to seek shareholder approval for a
stock option plan, companies may still seek this authorization so
that the board of directors gains substantial protection from deriva-
proposed by the NYSE will provide listed companies with more flexibility in is-
suing stock option or purchase plans while still adequately protecting share-
holder rights to approve those plans that will have a material effect on their eq-
uity." Id. at :-3. The New York Stock Exchange's Listed Company Manual
contains the new rules in §§ 312.03-312.04. See id. at "1.
89. See Big Board Approves Tighter Definition of Stock Option Plan, WAL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at B10.
90. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40679, available in 1998 WL 788860, at *3 (Nov. 13, 1998). The task force was
comprised of representatives from the Individual Investors Advisory Commit-
tee, the Pension Managers Advisory Committee, and representatives of commit-
tees associated with companies or the NYSE itself. See id.
91. See id. at *1.
92. See id. at *2.
93. For example, in November 1998, the Council of Institutional Investors
sent a letter to the SEC stating that no option plan should be exempted from
shareholder approval. See Greg Ip, Big Board Proposal on Stock Options at
Listed Firms Comes Under Attack, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1999, at C6. In the let-
ter, the Council accused the NYSE of being "blatantly conflicted" by its desire to
attract to its listings companies that have option plans favorable to executives
and urged the SEC to "reclaim this issue as its own." Id. (quoting letter from
Sarah Teslik, executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors, to the
SEC (Nov. 1998)). Another group with strong institutional investor ties, Insti-
tutional Shareholder Services, argued that the NYSE was trying to compete
with the Nasdaq for listings of high-tech companies where "executive compensa-
tion and [option] plans are a hot-button issue." Id. (quoting Patrick McGurn,
director of corporate programs for Institutional Shareholder Services).
94. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Extension of the Comment
Period for the Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-40847, available in 1998 WL 898486, at *1 (Dec.
28, 1998). As a result of this extension, the proposed rule was not adopted in
time for the 1999 proxy season. See Ip, supra note 93, at C6.
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tive suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty. 5 For example, in Dela-
ware, if the board of directors that approves the stock option plan is
comprised of "interested" directors, they will bear the burden of
proof in a lawsuit challenging their actions.96 By getting the share-
holders to ratify this decision, the directors in most cases will be
protected from personal liability against charges that they violated
97their duty of loyalty and their duty of care.
Although shareholder approval is still required in many circum-
stances, increasing shareholder opposition levels have led some
boards to devise strategies to avoid shareholder votes when possi-
ble."5 For example, one such strategy is to add a provision to a
shareholder-approved plan that allows management to replenish the
pool of authorized shares in the plan using repurchased shares."
95. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 24.
96. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1998); see also Eric J. Witten-
berg, Underwater Stock Options: What's a Board of Directors to Do?, 38 AIM. U.
L. REv. 75, 85-86 (1988) (stating that, if the board is disinterested in the trans-
action and satisfies its other fiduciary duties, then its decision to approve the
stock option plan will normally be protected by the business judgment rule
when being reviewed by the courts).
97. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335-36 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding
that shareholder ratification of a stock plan that includes directors as potential
beneficiaries will act as an impediment to the allegation of violation of duty of
loyalty or duty of care).
98. As discussed infra Part IV, this opposition appears to be growing over
time. One possible reason for this increase in shareholder disapproval might be
the increase in institutional investor activism because of high levels of executive
and director stock ownership-over 3.5% average beneficial ownership at large
American companies. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 10. This num-
ber grows to 11.9% if we take into account the tremendous potential dilution of
shareholders' equity that could result if already authorized but unissued and
already granted but unvested stock options are actually granted and exercised.
See id.
Wagner argued that, although resistance had grown and should cause
some concern, the reports of this trend are often overstated. Richard Wagner,
Obtaining Shareholder Approval of Stock Plans, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1997, at 13. He
stated that "75 percent of companies seeking plan or share authorization still
enjoy the support of 80 percent of their voting shareholders, and more than half
enjoy 90 percent plus support." Id.
Wagner found that one of the main reasons that stock option plans fail or
that there is high resistance to them is because of poor communication between
management and the shareholders. Id. at 13-14. In response to this problem,
he proposed four guidelines that management should follow in order to be suc-
cessful in gaining shareholder approval for stock option plans. First, "[d]ecide
what the business needs even f it 'violates' some interest group's or institution's
guidelines." Id. at 14. Second, "[iidentify and heed those who own the business
not just to the loudest voices." Id. at 15. Third, "[j]ustify the business need and
then propose only what is required." Id. Finally, "[communicate business and
competitive strategy directly to the owners, in the proxy and perhaps in per-
sonal contact." Id. at 16.
99. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 17-18. Wittenberg suggested
a similar strategy when dealing with underwater options. Wittenberg, supra
note 96, at 104-05. He recommended that, when devising stock option plans,
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Although these plans do not directly dilute the remaining share-
holders' stake in the company, ' this strategy nevertheless causes a
transfer of voting control and wealth of the company from the unaf-
filiated shareholders to corporate management.!0
III. FOUR CASE STUDIES OF DEFEATED STOCK OPTION PLANS
In our data set for the 1998 proxy season, shareholders defeated
only four companies' proposals to amend stock option plans. In this
section, we examine each of these companies and their proposed
plans to try to determine what led to this result.
A. Gymboree Corporation
The Gymboree Corporation ("Gymboree") is based in
Burlingame, California."2 The company specializes in desiging,
manufacturing, and retailing high-quality children's apparel. It
operates 434 stores in the United States and abroad.04 After a
management change in 1997 that successfully dealt with the com-
pany's persistent inventory problems, the company was rated the
"Stock of the Week" by the San Francisco Chronicle.0 ' Gymboree's
stock closed at $24.94 on July 11, 1997.'06
In the following months, the company engaged in a $30 million
stock repurchase program' and had several strong quarters of fi-
nancial results, with the result that its stock price rose 26% in 1997,
to close at $28.69 per share on December 4, 1997.0' This upward
trend continued into 1998, leading Gary White, president and chief
executive officer, to state that, "Fiscal 1997 was a year of building
the committee in charge should write in a provision that allows it to issue new
options when the stock price falls under the exercise price. See id. By doing
this, the committee no longer needs to get shareholder approval every time it
wishes to reissue because, if the shareholders ratified the master stock option
plan, they will have already given their permission. See id. Finally, by wording
the plan correctly, the directors can also be protected from corporate waste
and/or other charges by the business judgment rule, as long as they operate
with sound judgment. See id. at 105.
100. This is true because the replenished shares are coming from repur-
chased shares. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 71, at 18.
101. See id. Repurchased share programs may also become very expensive
for the company if the market price of the company's stock goes up and, thereby,
leads to a "buy high, sell low" situation. See id. at 21.
102. See Carol Emert, The Gymboree Corp. /Stock of the Week, S.F. CHRON.,
July 14, 1997, at B3.
103. See id.
104. See Gymboree Board Authorizes an Additional $30 Million Stock Re-
purchase Program, Bus. WiRE, Nov. 20, 1997, available in WESTLAW, BWIRE
Database [hereinafter Gymboree Board Authorizes].
105. See Emert, supra note 102, at B3.
106. See id.
107. See Gymboree Board Authorizes, supra note 104.
108. See Gymboree's Chief Financial Officer to Resign, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1997, at D2.
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for Gymboree," and that Gymboree was positioned for strong and
profitable growth in 1998.09
Investors, therefore, were quite disappointed when, on April 10,
1998, Gymboree reported that "its first-quarter and full-year net in-
come would fall below year-earlier levels and analysts' projec-
tions."11 ° Its stock tumbled sharply in response, dropping 9.4% to
$21.625 per share."'
Just a little more than a month later, Gymboree held its annual
shareholder's meeting to vote on, among other things, amendments
to its 1993 stock option plan."2  The most important proposed
amendment would have changed the plan into an evergreen plan,
113
adding two million shares to the plan' 4 and automatically increas-
ing that number on the date of each subsequent annual stockhold-
ers' meeting so that the number of shares reserved for issuance un-
der the plan always would equal two million shares."5 If enacted,
the plan's initial increase of two million shares would have raised
the total dilution from all stock option plans to 21%."1
The Gymboree shareholders overwhelmingly defeated this pro-
posal, with 80.2% of shareholders"7 voting against it (including
12.9% that abstained)."8 The incredibly high negative shareholder
109. The Gymboree Corporation Reports 18% Increase in 4th Quarter 1997
EPS, Bus. WIE, Feb. 18, 1998, available in WESTLAW, BWIRE Database.
110. Larry Bauman, Stocks End Higher, While Trailing Blue Chips;
CommNet Cellular and Triple S Plastics Surge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at
C7.
111. See id.
112. See Gymboree Corp., SEC Proxy Statement, Apr. 20, 1998, at 3, avail-
able in WESTLAW, SECNOW Database.
113. See Lublin & Scism, supra note 74, at 5B. "An evergreen plan lets
boards automatically grant a certain portion of outstanding shares every year
as options." Id.
114. See Gymboree Corp., supra note 112, at 8. This would bring "the total
number of shares reserved for future grant under the 1993 Plan to 2,353,815
shares, and raising the number of shares available since inception of the Plan to
6,025,000." Id.
115. See id. The second amendment was to "impose annual limits on the
number of shares subject to stock option grants... as 'performance-based' com-
pensation within the meaning of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code."
Id. The final amendment was to "provide for the award of 'common stock
equivalents,' pursuant to which recipients will be entitled to receive shares of
Common Stock on a future date (such as the recipient's retirement or other
termination of employment)." Id.
116. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 9.
117. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS ON ExECUTIVE STOCK PLANS, IRRC
BACKGROUND REPORT 9 (1999) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS]. Institu-
tional investors control 90% of the company's voting power. See id.
118. See id. Undeterred by this failure, on February 9, 1999, Gymboree held
a special shareholders meeting to contemplate a revised proposal. See id. A
Gymboree spokesperson commented that "[t]hey have heard the shareholders'
views and are taking actions which are more consistent with what shareholders
want." Lublin & Scism, supra note 74, at 5B. The revised plan will still seek
the two million additional shares. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS, supra note
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vote on the Gymboree proposal appears to be explained by several
factors. The evergreen nature of the plan and its high potential to
dilute existing shareholders undoubtedly played an important role
in the outcome of the vote. However, the unexpected drop in the
company's stock price only a month before the annual shareholders'
meeting may have served to underscore the shareholders' concerns
about the plan itself.
B. Structural Dynamics Research Corporation
Structural Dynamics Research Corporation ("SDRC") is based
in Milford, Ohio.' The company specializes in making and distrib-
uting software products that perform a wide variety of tasks ranging
from product data management to computer aided drafting.20 The
products are geared to helping manufacturers "improve product
quality while reducing product development time and cost."121 The
company "employs about 1,860 people and has 61 offices in 13 coun-
tries throughout North America, Europe, and the Asia/Pacific re-
gion.
'
"
12 2
After an accounting scandal and an interim period of caretaker
management by one of the company's founders, 12 3 in June 1997,
SDRC hired a new CEO and president. 124 This management change
was followed by generally strong economic results that raised the
company's stock price. As of April 29, 1998, the company's stock
price had reached $27.25.125
117, at 9. "However, it would remove language from the plan that specifically
contemplated repricing underwater options (leaving the plan silent on that is-
sue), lower the per-employee annual limit from 500,000 shares to 400,000, and
omit the evergreen feature." Id.
119. See Ex-SDRC Exec Tolani Gets 1 Year In Jail, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 6,
1997, at B16 [hereinafter Ex-SDRC Exec].
120. See SDRC New CEO: SDRC Board of Directors Announces Successful
Conclusion of Search for New Chief Executive Officer, BUS. WIRE, June 19, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, BWIRE Database.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See SDRC Selects William Weyand as New CEO, CIN. ENQUIRER, June
20, 1997, at B12 [hereinafter SDRC Selects William Weyand]. The accounting
scandal consisted of a former executive, Tony Solani, causing SDRC to inflate
revenue and earnings reports to the government and investors. See Ex-SDRC
Exec, supra note 119, at B16. Solani, during his period of misconduct, received
$680,617 from stock transactions and bonuses. See id.
124. See SDRC Selects William Weyand, supra note 123, at B12. Bill Wey-
and formerly was an executive vice president for Measurex Corp. See id.
Measurex founder David Bossen said, "Weyand is known for achieving consis-
tent revenue and profit growth in operations under his direction." Nick Miller,
SDRC's New Chief Brings Global Know-How: Weyand Succeeds Co-Founder as
CEO, CIN. POST, June 23, 1997, at 8B.
125. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp.: Tecnomatrix Technologies
Agrees to Joint Development, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3492026.
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On May 7, 1998, SDRC held its annual shareholders meeting, at
which management proposed that the shareholders approve the
adoption of SDRC's long-term stock incentive plan.125 While SDRC
had an existing incentive plan, approved by shareholders in 1994,
management told shareholders that this plan contained insufficient
stock to meet the future needs of the company.117
The new plan would provide an additional 4.2 million shares for
awards to qualifying employees, representing about 11% of the com-
pany's stock.1" Furthermore, the new plan gave the board and the
plan administrators tremendous discretion in awarding this stock. 29
Most notably, the board could reprice stock options without share-
holder approval."'0 Total potential dilution from all of the company's
stock plans would have reached 30.8%." 1
Despite the company's strong performance, its shareholders re-
jected the 1998 incentive plan, with 53.7% of them voting against it
or abstaining.1 12 Some institutional shareholders voted against the
plan because they felt that it would dilute their holdings too much.133
An SDRC spokesman stated, "Out of our top five institutional
shareholders, three were for the plan and two were against. But the
two opposed are the largest, with about 25 percent of the company's
stock. .... "" The absence of a restriction on repricing stock options
may have also likely played a part in the shareholder vote.
C. VLSI Technology, Inc.
VLSI Technology, Inc. ("VLSI") is based in San Jose, Califor-
nia."5 The company specializes in designing and manufacturing in-
tegrated circuits."' The products are geared toward the communica-tions, consumer digital entertainment, and computing markets.37
126. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp., SEC Proxy Statement, Apr. 1,
1998, at 1, available in WESTLAW, SECNOW Database.
127. See id. at 13.
128. See Mike Boyer, SDRC Proposal Rejected; Big Shareholders Fear Stock
Dilution, QIN. ENQUIRER, May 8, 1998, at B12. Under the 1994 plan, the
amount of stock that could be granted could not exceed 4% of the outstanding
stock. See id. The 4.2 million shares for the 1998 plan represents about 11% of
SSRC's 37 million shares outstanding. See id.
129. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp., supra note 126, at 14.
130. See id. at A8-A9. The board did not need shareholder approval to
amend the plan, except in six circumstances. See id.
131. See HAMBLY & MONACO, supra note 10, at 36.
132. See MANAGEMENTPROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9.
133. See Boyer, supra note 128, at B12. The plan would have created 11.7%
potential dilution. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9.
134. SDRC Vote: No on New Options, CIN. POST, May 8, 1998, at 10C.
135. See VLSI Technology: Mysticom and VLSI Technology Ink Agreement to
Offer High Performance Fast Ethernet PHY, PREssWIRE, June 22, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 21026139.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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VLSI employs approximately 2200 employees worldwide.'38
From May 1997 to January 1998, VLSI shares bounced around
as the company's fortunes fluctuated."9 However, after the markets
had closed on February 26, 1998, VLSI announced that first-quarter
earnings would be "significantly" under analysts' estimates.40 This
announcement sent VLSI stock down $5.438 (22%), closing at
$19.313 on the volume of 1.5 million shares traded.'
On May 14, 1998, VLSI held its annual shareholders' meeting.
4 2
The board sought shareholder approval for a variety of different
amendments to existing stock option plans. These included:
amending the 1992 Stock Plan to increase, from 9,500,000 to
11,500,000, the number of shares reserved for issuance in it and
amending the 1986 Directors' Stock Option Plan by, among other
things, adding 300,000 shares to the number reserved for issu-
ance.'" Under the terms of the proposed amendments to the 1992
Stock Plan, the plan administrator would be able to set the option
exercise price at less than fair market value.'4 The increase in the
number of shares covered by the plan would have also potentially
diluted shareholders by an additional 4.4%.' 4 This proposal failed,
with 63.5% of the shareholders voting against it. 147 The proposed
amendments to add 300,000 shares to the 1986 Directors Stock Op-
tion Plan failed, with 50.6% of the shareholders voting against it.
If these proposals had passed, the total company dilution from all of
the VLSI stock option plans would have reached 43.9%.149 These
negative votes may perhaps be best explained as a function of the
138. See id.
139. See VLSI Technology Reports Record Revenues and Profits, EDGE:
WORK-GROUP COMPUTING REP., Jan. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9039853.
140. Charlene Oldham, VLSI's Shares Fall After Disappointing Earnings,
Revenue Estimates, Dow JONES ONLINE NEws, Feb. 27, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, DJONLINEN Database. The stated reason was lower order levels
for wireless communications products and satellite set-top boxes. See id. VLSI
"believes a 'significant' part of that order-level softness is cyclical in nature."
Id.
141. See id.
142. See VLSI Technology, Inc., SEC Proxy Statement, May 14, 1998, at 2,
available in WESTLAW, SECNOW Database.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 25, 31.
145. See id. at 26.
146. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9.
147. See id.
148. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERV., INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CTR., VOTING REsuLTs 1998 71 (1999).
149. See MANAGEAIENT PROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9. In the months fol-
lowing this meeting, three of the top executives at VLSI left, and management
turmoil resulted. See id. Through the rest of 1998, VLSI's stock kept dropping,
and senior management kept quitting. See id. Although things started to pick
up in the beginning of 1999, in March, Phillips Electronics N.V. mounted an ag-
gressive takeover of VLSI, offering $17 per share. See id.
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high degree of dilution created by the company's stock option plans
and the company's poor recent performance.
D. PhyCor Inc.
PhyCor Inc. ("PhyCor") is based in Nashville, Tennessee.160 The
company is a "physician practice management company that oper-
ates multi-specialty clinics and manages independent practice asso-
ciations (IPAs)." 5' As of April 1997, it operated "47 clinics with ap-
proximately 3,250 physicians in 27 states and managed IPAs with
over 15,800 physicians in 23 markets." 52
After a series of small acquisitions, on October 29, 1997, PhyCor
announced that it would be acquiring its larger, major rival, Med-
Partners Inc.' The deal was valued at more than $8 billion, with a
$6.98 billion stock swap and PhyCor assuming about $1.2 billion in
debt.5 4 As soon as the markets opened the next day, PhyCor's stock
plummeted due to investor fears that it had agreed to an excessive
price for the acquisition. 55 The stock fell $5.56 to $24.00 per
share. 56
In December 1997, rumors of merger troubles began to surface
as the spread between PhyCor and MedPartners stock grew to $6.00
per share. 57 On January 7, 1998, PhyCor and MedPartners called
off the merger."' This failed merger was very costly to PhyCor: on
January 12, 1998, it disclosed more than $100 million in merger-
related charges in its fourth-quarter 1997 and first-quarter 1998 re-
150. See PhyCor Reports First Quarter Results, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 22, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, BWIREPLUS Database.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Julie Bell & Stacy Hartmann, PhyCor Deal Creates Giant,
TENNESSEAN, Oct. 30, 1997, at 1E. After the acquisition, the combined company
would have represented 5% of all physicians in the United States. See id.
154. See Martha Brannigan, PhyCor, MedPartners in $6.98 Billion Deal,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at A3. The proposed deal was still subject to share-
holder ratification, approval of various state and federal agencies, and other
customary conditions. See id.
155. See Shares of PhyCor, MedPartners Fall on Worries About Merger
Plans, Dow JoNEs ONLINE NEWS, Oct. 31, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
WIRESPLUS Database. Investors also worried that Phycor's risk profile would
be increased and that its growth potential would be reduced. See id.
156. See id.
157. See PhyCor/MedPartners to Be Reworked?, 10 MERGER & AcQUISITIONS
REP., Dec. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12988409 [hereinafter Phy-
CorlMedPartners To Be Reworked?]. Usually, as the deal draws closer to clos-
ing, the spread narrows; in this case, however, it had been widening. See Julie
Bell, PhyCor Merger May Be in Trouble, Analysts Say, TENNEsSEAN, Dec. 10,
1997, at 1E. During this time, there was talk that the deal would be restruc-
tured to the detriment of MedPartners. See PhyCor/MedPartners to Be Re-
worked?, supra.
158. See David R. Olmos, MedPartners, PhyCor Scrap Shaky Merger, L.A.
TmEs, Jan. 8, 1998, at D2. The reason cited by the two companies was differ-
ences in business philosophies and practices. See id.
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sults. 9 PhyCor's stock promptly dropped 15%, to close at $19.00.16
On June 1, 1998, the day before its annual shareholders meeting,
PhyCor's stock fell to a 52-week low of $16.13.161
On June 2, 1998, PhyCor held its annual shareholders meeting,
at which it asked its shareholders to approve amendments to its
1988 Incentive Stock Plan and to adopt a new 1998 Incentive Stock
Plan.62 In amending the 1988 plan, management sought to increase
the number of available shares by 1.3 million.'63 This plan would
have permitted the board to award non-qualified options at 50% of
the fair market value.6 Shareholders rejected this proposal, with
63.2% voting against the amendments.'
The proposed 1998 plan would have had six million shares re-
served for issuance.166 Again, non-qualified options could be granted
at 50% of the fair market value.'67 The plan was silent as to whether
shareholder approval would be needed before management could re-
price the options, thereby allowing them to do so.68 This proposal
failed, with 62.9% of the shareholders voting against it.
69
Collectively, these proposals would have increased total poten-
tial dilution to 35.5%.170 This is "well above the average dilution lev-
els for other smallcap companies and an industry peer group." 7'
That, on top of the company's poor stock performance and the ability
of the plans' administrators to issue discount options and to reprice
options, may have persuaded shareholders to vote against them.
E. Summary of Important Factors
The common thread that ties together the defeat of these four
companies' stock option plans is the relatively high level of total
company dilution for shareholders resulting from all of their plans.
When we look at the companies at which stock option plans were de-
feated, the total potential dilution arising from all stock option
plans, including those proposed in 1998, ranged from a low of about
20% at Gymboree to a high of 43.9% at VLSI. However, total poten-
159. See Anita Sharpe, PhyCor to Take More Than $100 Million in Charges,
Sending Stock Down 15%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1998, at A3. The charges re-
lated to the termination of the deal and restructuring costs. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Julie Bell, PhyCor Hits Low, Stays Optimistic, TENNESSEAN, June 2,
1998, at 1E.
162. See Phycor Inc., SEC Proxy Statement, June 2, 1998, at 2, available in
WESTLAW, SECNOW Database.
163. See id. at 6.
164. See id. at 7.
165. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9.
166. See Phycor Inc., supra note 162, at 11.
167. See id. at 53 B-3.
168. See id. at 63 B-13, 64 B-14.
169. See MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS, supra note 117, at 9.
170. See id.
171. Id.
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tial dilution is not the only important factor.
For example, at Gymboree, the defeated plan was an evergreen
plan, which would have been indefinitely replenished without
shareholder approval if it had been adopted. To make matters
worse for management, the company's stock price dropped suddenly
on bad earnings news shortly before the company's annual share-
holders' meeting. Similar stories emerge for the other companies
discussed: high potential dilution accompanied by some other factor
seem to explain the stock option plan's defeat. In the case of SDRC,
the plan's failure to prohibit stock option repricing appears to have
been important to shareholders already worried about excessive di-
lution. For VLSI and PhyCor, the potential for plan administrators
to issue discount options may have tipped the scale.
To better unpack these effects, we need to isolate the impacts of
each of these factors on how shareholders vote on stock option plans.
In the next section, we turn to univariate statistical tests and multi-
ple regression analysis to isolate the influences of the different as-
pects of stock option plans on shareholder voting.
IV. DATA AND RESULTS
A Data
We obtain a shareholder voting database from the Investor Re-
sponsibility Research Center ("IRRC") that contains voting results
on 637 management proposals on stock option plans as well as in-
formation on various features of those plans. Voting results are re-
ported in one of two ways-either as the percent of votes cast or as a
percent of total outstanding voting securities. Since most firms re-
port results based on the percent of votes cast, we convert the votes
that are reported as a percent of total outstanding voting securities
into a measure of the percent of votes cast.172 We include absten-
tions together with votes against the proposals to determine the
variable AGAINST, the percent of votes cast against a proposal.173
We begin by noting that only five proposals in our sample were
defeated by shareholders, or less than 1% of the plans proposed. On
average, we find the average level of shareholder opposition equaled
172. At most firms, a majority of the votes cast is sufficient to approve the
adoption or amendment of a stock option plan. While other firms require an af-
firmative vote of a majority of the firm's outstanding shares to approve these
plans, for our purposes, the main concern is to have comparable data. We are
much less concerned with which plans pass or fail.
173. State law generally treats abstentions as "no" votes for shareholder
votes on stock option plans. See generally RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T.
DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed.
1998). Average abstentions in our sample amount to only 0.7%. The median
level of abstentions was 0.2%. In a total of six proposals, abstentions were be-
tween 5% and 10%, and in seven proposals abstentions were between 10% and
18%, the maximum percent of abstaining votes.
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18.6%. This indicates a strong level of shareholder support for stock
option plans generally. However, there were wide variations in the
level of support for the plans that were approved. In the remainder
of this section, we empirically examine the determinants of the vari-
able AGAINST. We begin by presenting the results of univariate
tests of various factors that lead shareholders to vote against man-
agement proposals on stock options.
B. Univariate Tests on Different Features of Stock Option Plans
1. Dilution
The potential dilutive effect of stock options on existing share-
holders appears from the case studies to be a major determinant of
how shareholders vote on management-sponsored stock option pro-
posals. In this Article, we use two measures of dilution: total dilu-
tion and dilution pertaining to each individual proposal. Total dilu-
tion, indicated by the variable TOTALDIL, is calculated as all
shares reserved for future grants of stock options plus the number of
shares subject to outstanding options divided by the total number of
voting securities. As noted above in Section I.A, many institutional
shareholders vote against stock option proposals if the total dilution
of all the company's stock option plans total more than 10%. A total
of 489 (77%) of the 637 proposals studied in this Article involve
TOTALDIL greater than 10%.
In addition to total dilution, investors also may consider the
amount of dilution created by the individual proposal being voted
upon. We term this measure of dilution DILPROP, which is calcu-
lated as the number of shares reserved for future grants of options
plus the number of shares subject to outstanding options in a given
proposal divided by the total number of voting securities outstand-
ing. Stock option proposals that involve DILPROP less than 5% are
considered "routine" under stock exchange rules. This means that
brokers and other intermediaries can vote on them when their cli-
ents fail to execute their proxies.74 Proposals for plans involving
more than 5% dilution are not routine, and therefore, the beneficial
owners must give voting instructions to these intermediaries.
Companies try to keep the dilution on any individual proposal
below the 5% threshold so that brokers can cast routine ballots for
two reasons. First, brokers normally vote for management's propos-
als.75 Second, it reduces the number of abstentions and nonvotes.76
Abstentions are counted as votes against a proposal when the pro-
posal must pass with an affirmative vote of the majority of the votes
cast. Nonvotes are counted as votes against a proposal when the
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
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proposal must pass with an affirmative vote of a majority of all out-
standing shares. In either of these situations, the company's pro-
posals are more likely to pass if brokers can vote because the matter
is classified as a routine matter under stock exchange rules. Of the
637 proposals studied in this Article, we find that DILPROP is
greater than 5% for 201 (32%) of them.
In Panel A of Table 1, we report the average vote against stock
option proposals, AGAINST, by whether TOTALDIL is below 10%
("low" TOTALDIL) or above 10% ('high" TOTALDIL), and whether
DILPROP is below 5% ("low" DILPROP) or above 5% ("high"
DILPROP). The results show that average AGAINST is highest,
24.8%, for the 185 proposals in which TOTALDIL is high and
DILPROP is high. This average is significantly greater than the av-
erage AGAINST of 18.3%, which occurs when DILPROP is low and
TOTALDIL is high. The t-statistic for the difference is 5.07. The
average AGAINST for high TOTALDIL and high DILPROP (24.8%)
is also significantly greater than the average AGAINST of the low
TOTALDIL/high DILPROP combination (AGAINST = 9.2%, t-
statistic = 6.55). However, no significant difference exists in aver-
age AGAINST between low and high DILPROP when TOTALDIL is
low. These results suggest that, on average, stockholders cast more
no votes when TOTALDIL is high, but their evaluation of DILPROP
may depend on the level of TOTALDIL.
2. Adoption of New Plan Versus Adding Shares to Existing
Plan
We next examine average AGAINST, TOTALDIL, and
DILPROP by whether the proposal involves the adoption of a new
plan or the addition of shares to an existing plan. Typically, adop-
tion of a new plan is the replacement of an existing plan by a new
plan. The new plan may include new features and will always in-
clude the maximum number of shares that can be granted under the
plan. Panel B of Table 1 reports that average AGAINST for plans
that add shares to existing plans, 21.0%, is significantly greater
than for plans being adopted, 16.6% (t-statistic = -4.21). Proposals
that add more shares to existing plans also have significantly more
total dilution (TOTALDIL = 17.8%) than proposals in which a new
plan is being adopted (TOTALDIL = 15.3%, t-statistic = -3.67), al-
though average DILPROP is very similar for new plans (4.9%) and
plans that add shares (4.3%).
3. Participant Eligibility
The stock option plans in our sample have three basic levels of
participant eligibility as reported in Panel C of Table 1. In 268 of
the 637 proposals (42%), all employees are eligible to participate in
the plan. In 251 proposals (39% of the total), the plans are primarily
for a limited group of executives and/or directors. Finally, in 118
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proposals (19%), only outside directors may participate in the stock
option plan. Proposals for plans benefiting all employees experience
significantly higher AGAINST (22.1%) compared to plans for either
executives (18.1%) or outside directors (11.9%). The t-statistic com-
paring average AGAINST for all employees' plans versus executives'
plans is 3.41, while it is 8.27 when comparing all employees' plans
with outside directors' plans. However, it is also the case that
TOTALDIL is significantly higher for all employees' plans (18.1%)
compared to executives' plans (15.2%), even though DILPROP is not.
Outside director plans have the smallest average DILPROP and
AGAINST. However, TOTALDIL for outside directors is not signifi-
cantly different from plans for executives (t-statistic = 0.07). These
results suggest that the more widespread the stock option plan, the
greater is the no vote. However, since TOTALDIL is higher for
plans in which all employees can be eligible, this conclusion must
await further testing in a multivariate regression model.
4. Firm Performance
We also compare average AGAINST for firms that have market
adjusted stock price performance that is above the median for the
sample and those that have market adjusted stock price perform-
ance that is below the median for the sample. We obtained 1-year,
3-year, and 5-year total stock returns from the June 1998 Standard
& Poor's ExecuComp database. ExecuComp contains executive
compensation data as well as firm performance data for firms con-
tained in the S&P Super 1500 index. We calculate a market average
return for 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods by averaging the re-
turns for all firms on the database that have been publicly traded
for 1, 3, and 5 years, respectively. Market-adjusted returns are then
calculated as the difference between a firm's return over the speci-
fied interval and the market average return over the same time pe-
riod. One-year market-adjusted returns are denoted MARET1YR, 3-
year returns are denoted MARET3YR, and 5-year returns are de-
noted MARET5YR.
A total of 415 firms in our sample have 1-year stock returns
available. The average (median) MARETIYR is -2.79% (-6.74%),
with the lowest market-adjusted return being -116.92% and the
highest being 507.47%. The average (median) MARET3YR is -0.06%
(-1.87%), while the low return is -73.40% and the high return is
120.27%. The average (median) MARET5YR is 1.05% (-1.55%),
while the low return is -43.88% and the high return is 73.62%.
For MARETlYR, MARET3YR, and MARET5YR, we split the
sample at the respective medians to form two groups, "low" returns
and "high" returns. Panel D of Table 1 shows average AGAINST by
the two groups of returns. For 1-year market-adjusted returns, no
difference in average AGAINST exists. However, proposals at firms
for which 3-year market-adjusted returns are low garner a signifi-
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cantly lower vote against the plans. In other words, stockholders
vote more favorably, on average, for proposals when the company's
stock price performance has been low than when stock performance
has been high. Although, Panel D also shows that, with a
TOTALDIL of 14.4%, dilution is significantly lower for firms that
have had low 3-year stock performance than for firms with high 3-
year market-adjusted stock returns (TOTALDIL = 16.7%, t-statistic
for difference in average TOTALDIL = 2.64). Similar results are ob-
tained using MARET5YR. In the regression estimation, we examine
whether the impact of prior firm performance is a significant deter-
minant of AGAINST or whether TOTALDIL is a mitigating factor.
5. Features of Stock Option Plans
The IRRC database contains information about the features of
each stock option plan. In this section, we examine the impact of
several of these features on average AGAINST for those plans which
contain them. Shareholders may vote against plans with these fea-
tures for a variety of reasons, including that they believe that the
feature can lead to even higher dilution than the plan initially cre-
ates; that they believe the feature can increase the likelihood actual
dilution will, in fact, take place; or because they believe that the
plan is simply giving participants "too good of a deal."
a. Evergreen plans. Evergreen stock option plans set aside a
low, specified percentage of the company's outstanding shares for
award each year.177 True evergreen plans have no termination date,
while their cousin, quasi-evergreen plans, do have a termination
date, typically several years after their creation.178
Many shareholders have opposed the adoption of evergreen
plans because, once adopted, they are no longer subject to share-
holder approval for the rest of their life. 179 Even though these plans
allow only a low percentage of the company's stock to be awarded on
an annual basis, over time, these plans can result in substantial di-
lution of existing shareholders.' Although a substantial number of
institutional shareholders have voting policies dictating an auto-
matic no vote on these plans, there is some evidence that share-
holder opposition to these plans is decreasing over time.'8 '
As stockholders generally cast more no votes when dilution is
high (see Table 1), they are more likely to oppose features that can
lead to even more dilution without their approval. This sentiment is
reflected in the average AGAINST of 28.2% for plans with evergreen
or quasi-evergreen provisions, compared to an average negative vote
177. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
178. See HAMBLY & MONACO, supra note 10, at 10-12.
179. See id.
180. See RuXTON, supra note 10, at 22.
181. See id.
[Vol. 35
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
of 18.0% without the feature (see Table 2). The difference between
these levels is statistically significant (t = 3.77).
b. Discount options. The overwhelming majority of compa-
nies grant their executives stock options with their exercise price set
at fair market value for the company's stock, that is, "at the
money."182 However, in a handful of cases, companies have awarded
their executives stock options with below-market, or discounted, ex-
ercise prices. 83
Many shareholders have criticized this practice, arguing that
discount options give executives less incentive to work to raise the
company's stock price than "at the money" options.8 4 Without such
incentives, the argument that awarding stock options better moti-
vates managers loses much of its force. Not surprisingly, many in-
stitutional investors' voting policies require a no vote on plans con-
taining these provisions.'8 '
The average AGAINST of 24.2% for plans that can issue dis-
count options is significantly higher than for plans without the fea-
ture (t-statistic = 5.97). This result is consistent with stockholders
who, on average, disapprove of issuing discount options.
c. Repricing underwater options. Almost all stock options are
issued "at the money," that is, with an exercise price set at the cur-
rent market price for the stock.'86 If the company's stock price
should drop below this exercise price at some point before the op-
tions are exercised, they are said to be "underwater" or "below the
money.""' Underwater options do not have immediate economic
value because they cost more to exercise than the underlying secu-
rity is worth. 8' The most direct way to restore the value of these op-
tions is for the company to reprice them, either by lowering the ex-
ercise price of the options themselves, or by issuing new
replacement options with a lower strike price.'89
182. ISOs must have a minimum exercise price of 100% of fair market value
in order to qualify for preferential tax treatment. See id. at 20. While nonquali-
fled stock options do not have such a requirement, most companies follow the
same practice of setting the exercise price at fair market value. See id.
183. In 1998, IRRC found that only 12 of the 1189 companies whose proxy
statements it examined had given their executives discounted options. See id.
They also found that 29 companies in the same sample had given their execu-
tives options that were premium priced, that is, whose exercise price was set
above fair market value. See id.
184. See id.
185. IRRC calculated that 24% of the institutions responding to its survey
had such policies, and another 55% stated that discounted options could lead
them to vote against a stock option plan. See id.
186. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
187. See Wittenberg, supra note 96, at 76.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 76-77.
20001
WAKE FORESTLAWREVIEW
Shareholders frequently object to boards of directors repricing
options. They claim that repricing amounts to a "giveaway" to man-
agers by providing them with price protection that other sharehold-
ers do not qualify to receive.' In response, corporate boards often
point out that underwater options cannot provide managers with the
appropriate incentives to perform better and that stock price de-
clines may be caused by drops in the overall market or industry-
wide conditions.'91 The case for repricing is most compelling where
the decline in the company's stock price can be attributed to forces
beyond management's control. Still, options should be "substan-
tially" underwater for an extended period of time before most ex-
perts say repricing should be considered. 92
Existing empirical research supports the opponents to repricing.
Don M. Chance, Raman Kumar, and Rebecca B. Todd found that op-
tion repricings occur in the wake of poor firm-specific performance,
not during general market or industry-wide declines. 93 Further,
they found that "repricings are not accompanied by offsetting factors
either in option terms or other cash compensation, and that many
firms reprice more than once." 94 A majority of the repriced options
had significant value prior to repricing and would have been at the
money within two years of the change. 5 Finally, they discovered
that "repricing is more likely for firms with insider-dominated
boards."' Menachem Brenner, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, and
David Yermack reached similar conclusions for a larger sample of
executives and firms.'97
Companies are not required to submit option repricings for
shareholder approval. 98 When they are submitted for such ap-
190. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 19 (pointing out that this signals a lack
of confidence in the company's future by permitting executives to be compen-
sated even if the company's stock price falls and that the stock market reacts
negatively to this signal).
191. See id.
192. See id. (citing experts who suggest two years or more as an appropriate
time period to wait before repricing an underwater option because options have
long lives and may recover their value before they expire).
193. Don M. Chance et al., The "Repricing" of Executive Stock Options 2-3
(Aug. 13, 1999) (unpublished working paper, available at <www.cob.vt.edu
/finance/faculty/dmc/vita.htm>).
194. Id. at 3.
195. See id. However, they found that the costs of repricings are relatively
small to shareholders even though they greatly benefit a few executives. See id.
196. Id.
197. Menachem Brenner et al., Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Op-
tions (Feb. 8, 1998) (N.Y.U. Working Paper FIN-98-010) (examining a sample of
396 executives who had options that had terms reset during the period from
1992-95).
198. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 18-19 (noting the SEC's response to Ver-
sar's inquiry of whether "shareholder approval was required for an exchange
program under which plan participants could exchange underwater options for
new, lower-priced options"). The SEC's staff opined that Versar's option re-
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proval, many shareholders will vote against stock option plans
whose language would allow the plan administrators to reprice un-
derwater options.1 In fact, many institutional investors have vot-
ing policies which lead them to vote against all such proposals.
210
Table 2 shows that investors do not approve of repricing under-
water options. The average AGAINST for plans that allow repricing
is 25.1%, whereas it is only 16.1% for plans that do not allow re-
pricing. The difference is statistically significant (t-statistic = 7.71).
d. Omnibus awards. Omnibus plans give the compensation
committee broad discretion to use a wide variety of stock-based
compensation techniques to reward executives. Commonly dubbed
"blank check stock option plans," these plans give their administra-
tors almost total control over the terms and forms of compensation
awarded to managers. 2  In our data set, omnibus plans are defined
as those plans where the plan administrators can dispense five or
more types of awards, or where they have discretionary authority to
grant "other stock-based awards" of an unspecified nature.
203
Shareholder opposition to these plans is two-fold. First, omni-
bus plans give plan administrators so much discretion that share-
holders fear that executives will be awarded less risky forms of
stock-based compensation that will do little to align the incentives of
managers with those of shareholders. 4 Second, some shareholders
claim that these programs are too generous to managers.2 05  For
these reasons, a significant number of institutional investors auto-
matically vote against these plans.0 6
The results of Table 2 reflect shareholder concerns and show
that the average AGAINST for plans that include omnibus awards is
21.1%, whereas it is 17.1% in plans without the feature. The differ-
ence is statistically significant (t-statistic = 3.64).
e. Time lapsing restricted stock. Time lapsing restricted stock
pricing did not require shareholder approval under Rule 16b-3 "provided that
new options could be granted... without shareholder approval." Versar, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,778,
at 78,490 (Sept. 23, 1991).
199. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 19 ("These shareholders say plans should
explicitly prohibit the practice and company boards and compensation commit-
tees should be willing to promise not to adjust underwater awards.").
200. See id. (noting that IRRC surveys showed that "about one-third of insti-
tutions say that their policies require withholding their support for a plan pro-
posal that includes repricing of underwater options; about half of the respon-
dents say this feature might affect their vote").
201. See id. at 22.
202. Id.
203. Id. On top of the great degree of discretion for administrators, these
plans often reserve a large number of shares for award. See id.
204. See id. at 23.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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is company stock that is given or sold, at a deep discount, to a corpo-
rate executive subject to the limitation that it cannot be sold during
a fixed period of time.0 7 Usually the restriction lasts for five years,
although there are instances where the restriction will continue un-
til the executive's retirement.
Restricted stock is a very popular form of long-term incentive
compensation.0 9 In 1996, roughly 28% of companies in the S&P 500
granted restricted stock to their executives.20 A broader study of
CEO pay at 1189 companies in the S&P Super 1500 found that, in
1998, 29.4% of the sample companies in the S&P 500 gave their
CEOs restricted stock with the median award worth $943,506.2"
The median value of CEOs' restricted stock holdings also increased
dramatically in 1998.212
Some shareholders have criticized compensation committees
that award large grants of restricted stock because they have value
whether the company's stock performs well or not.2 3 These critics
claim that restricted stock rewards executives merely for remaining•214
with the company, rather than for performing well.
In our sample, 281 of the 637 proposals (44%) include restricted
stock awards. The results in Table 2 show that the average vote
against plans containing this type of award is 20.8%, which is sig-
nificantly greater than the 16.9% vote against plans without re-
stricted stock awards (t-statistic = 3.74).
f Reload options. The reload option is a relatively recent in-
novation in stock option plans that has been the subject of substan-
tial controversy. The reload option acts as a means by which execu-
tives can lock in gains on their existing stock options generated by
increases in their company's stock price without giving up the op-
portunity to realize further gains if the company's stock price should
207. Other restrictions can also be imposed on the resale of the stock. For
example, the executive may not be able to sell the shares until certain profit
goals are realized or until her retirement.
208. See CRYSTAL, supra note 56, at 71. However, if the executive quits be-
fore the limitation period is up or is fired for just cause, then she forfeits the
stock. See id. at 72.
209. See id. at 71.
210. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 2516. These grants accounted for 22% of
the compensation of the executives that received grants. See id.
211. See RUXTON, supra note 2, at 3. These figures dropped to 23% and
$410,000, respectively, for sample companies in the S&P 400 MidCap Index,
while only 13.6% of the companies in the S&P 600 SmallCap gave such awards
with a median value of $229,550. See id.
212. See id. at 20. Ruxton reported that "CEOs in the S&P 500 saw a 33
percent increase in the median value of restricted stock holdings, reaching more
than $2.5 million, while SmallCap chiefs enjoyed an even more impressive 54
percent rise in their holdings." Id. at 21.
213. See RUXTON, supra note 10, at 21.
214. See id.
[Vol. 35
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
continue to increase.215
Mechanically, the reload option works as follows. Suppose that
one of the company's executives exercises some of her stock options
by selling shares of the company's stock that she already holds to
pay for the stock. If the executive is entitled to receive reload op-
tions, then the company will subsequently issue her a new stock op-
tion at the then prevailing current market price in an amount equal
to the number of shares that she sold when she exercised her stock
option.
Shareholder critics claim that reload options permit executives
to realize all of the increase in the company's stock price, while be-
ing protected from any later declines in the stock's value.216 Compa-
nies respond that reload options encourage executives to exercise
their options early and thereby become shareholders faster.217 This
leads to greater stock ownership by executives, which better aligns
managers' interests with those of shareholders. Despite these justi-
fications, a significant number of institutional investors automati-
cally vote against plans containing this type of option provision.218
In the 1998 proxy season, only 63 of the 637 proposals (10%)
contained a reload option feature. The average vote against plans
with the feature (20.4%) was not significantly higher than the aver-
age vote for plans without the feature (18.4%).
g. Change in control provisions. Many proposals (77% of the
sample) contain provisions that allow the options to immediately
vest upon a change in control of the company. These provisions are
generally uncontroversial because they give executives the incentive
to maximize the value of the company even if it means selling the
company and potentially losing employment with the acquiring
company.1 9 However, the univariate results in Table 2 indicate a
significantly higher vote against plans with a change in control pro-
vision (19.7%) than for plans without this provision (14.9%, t-
statistic = 4.07).
h. Methods of payment. Companies have come up with a va-
riety of methods by which executives can pay the exercise price for
their stock options. Some of these schemes have become controver-
sial because they sometimes give executives below-market rate
loans with which to purchase their shares, while others permit ex-
ecutives to exercise their options without any cash outlay, so-called
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Twelve percent of institutional investors have such policies according to
IRRC, while another 50% stated that they would consider voting against plans
containing these provisions. See id.
219. See id. at 20.
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"pyramiding" options.22 °
When loans are used as a method of payment, especially below-
market rate loans, shareholders complain that executives are re-
ceiving preferential treatment that is not available to them.22'
Roughly 22% of the institutional investors surveyed by IRRC had
voting policies that led them to vote no on these proposals automati-
cally.2
22
A total of 169 proposals (27%) in our sample include the possi-
bility of using loans to pay the exercise price. Stockholders appear
to disapprove of this practice, as the average vote against proposals
including the loan provision is 24.8%, while it is just 16.4% in pro-
posals without the provision. The difference is statistically signifi-
cant, with a t-statistic of 7.32.
Pyramiding of stock options occurs when the plan permits ex-
ecutives to exercise their options in a rapid series of transactions de-
signed to generate cash for the executive equal to the difference be-
tween the stock option's exercise price and the market price of the
stock without the executive being required to put up money to pur-
chase the stock. IRRC "defines pyramiding as any plan that al-
lows executives to exercise stock options using stock that has not
been held for a minimum holding period."24 A significant number of
institutional investors vote against plans containing these provi-
sions, probably because these plans reduce the risks to executives of
owning company stock and undermine the goal of increasing man-
agement's level of stock ownership.
A total of 412 (65%) of the proposals in our sample allow pyra-
miding. No significant difference exists in the average vote against
proposals permitting pyramiding (18.7%) compared to those that do
not allow it (18.4%).
i. Acceleration of vesting. These provisions entitle all out-
standing options to become fully vested upon some defined event.226
A total of 339 proposals (53%) in our sample contain acceleration
provisions. Like change in control provisions, stockholders disap-
prove of these provisions. Average AGAINST is 21.2% for plans that
include acceleration provisions compared to 15.7% for plans that do
not include these provisions. The difference is statistically signifi-
cant (t-statistic = 5.40).
220. See id. at 23.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 20.
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C. Multivariate Tests on Determinants of Shareholder Voting
Table 3 presents the results of four regression estimations
based on different specifications of dilution and a series of dummy
variables to account for the widespread availability of the options to
employees in the firm, whether the plan was new or not, and various
other features of the plans. The dependent variable in the regres-
sion, AGAINST, and the dilution variables, TOTALDIL and
DILPROP, have been defined above.227 The remaining dummy ex-
planatory variables are defined below:
ALLEMPLOYEES = 1 if all employees are eligible to receive op-
tions, 0 if only executives or outside directors are eligible.
ADDSHARES = 1 if the proposal is to add shares to existing
plan, 0 if the proposal is to adopt new plan.
EVERGREEN = 1 if the plan has an evergreen or quasi-
evergreen provision, 0 otherwise.
DISCOUNT = 1 if the company can award discounted options, 0
otherwise.
REPRICE = 1 if the company can reprice underwater options, 0
otherwise.
OMNIBUS = 1 if the plan includes more than five types of
awards, 0 otherwise.
RESTRICT =1 if time lapsing restricted stock is included in the
plan, 0 otherwise.
RELOAD = 1 if the plan contains a reload option, 0 otherwise.
CONTROL = 1 if the plan contains a change in control provi-
sion, 0 otherwise.
PYRAMID = 1 if pyramiding is allowed to pay the exercise price,
0 otherwise.
LOANS = 1 if the company gives loans to participants to pay ex-
ercise price, 0 otherwise.
ACCELERATE = 1 if company can accelerate the vesting time
for options, 0 otherwise.
In regressions 1 and 3, TOTALDIL is positively related to
AGAINST, and the coefficient is strongly significantly different from
zero (e.g., t-statistic = 9.38 in regression 1). However, as indicated
earlier, many institutional shareholders will seriously consider vot-
ing against a plan when total dilution is greater than 10%. This
statement suggests that, holding all else equal, there may be no re-
lation between TOTALDIL and AGAINST when TOTALDIL is less
than 10%, but the relationship would be positive when dilution ex-
ceeds 10%. Regressions 2 and 4 estimate the regression coefficient
227. Because AGAINST is bounded from below by 0.0 and from above by
100.0, we test the residuals from the regression equations to determine whether
they meet the conditions of normality. Our tests reject the null hypothesis of
normality. We therefore transform AGAINST by computing its square root and
re-estimate the regressions. Our results are unaffected by this transformation,
and we therefore report them using AGAINST as the dependent variable.
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for TOTALDIL over two separate segments: TOTALDIL less than
10% and TOTALDIL greater than 10%. The two segments are esti-
mated as follows:
TOTALDIL < 10% = TOTALDIL if TOTALDIL < 10%
= 10% if TOTALDIL > 10%
TOTALDIL > 10% = 0 if TOTALDIL < 10%
= TOTALDIL - 10% if TOTALDIL > 10%
However, regressions 2 and 4 show that both segments are posi-
tively and significantly related to AGAINST. Thus, as total dilution
increases, even over smaller levels of total dilution, the votes against
stock option proposals increase.
For the reasons outlined above, a 5% threshold for DILPROP
may be important in determining the level of shareholder opposition
to stock option proposals. Therefore, not only do we enter DILPROP
into regressions 1 and 2 as one variable, we also estimate the rela-
tionship between DILPROP and AGAINST over two different seg-
ments of DILPROP as shown below:
DILPROP < 5% = DILPROP if DILPROP < 5%
= 5% if DILPROP > 5%
DILPROP > 5% = 0 if DILPROP < 5%
= DILPROP - 5% if DILPROP > 5%
Regressions 1 and 2 show that DILPROP is positive and signifi-
cantly related to AGAINST. Regressions 3 and 4 show that, no mat-
ter whether DILPROP is less than 5% or greater than 5%, the coeffi-
cient is positive and significant.
In addition to the individual effects of TOTALDIL and
DILPROP, Panel A of Table 1 suggests that an interaction effect
may be present. In Table 1, average AGAINST is significantly dif-
ferent between the high TOTALDIL/high DILPROP combination
compared to the high TOTALDIL/low DILPROP combination,
whereas no significant difference is found when comparing average
AGAINST between the low TOTALDII/high DILPROP and low
TOTALDIL/low DILPROP combinations. To take this possibility
into account, we model an interaction effect in the regressions by
multiplying TOTALDIL by DILPROP. The sign on the interaction
coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero in all re-
gressions.
The interpretation of this coefficient is illustrated in Figure 1.
In this figure, a simple model was estimated using only TOTALDIL,
DILPROP, and the interaction variable. The predicted value of
AGAINST is calculated using the results of the regression assuming
TOTALDIL takes on various values ranging from 0% to 25%.
Within each category of TOTALDIL, DILPROP is allowed to vary
from 0% to 10% in one percentage point increments. The figure
shows that the slope of the predicted AGAINST line is flatter when
TOTALDIL is higher than when TOTALDIL is lower. Thus, the re-
lationship between DILPROP and AGAINST is more pronounced at
lower levels of TOTALDIL. We interpret these findings to mean
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that shareholders are very concerned about the amount of dilution
created by stock option plans, but that at low levels of total company
dilution, we will see higher levels of negative votes for individual
plans with significant dilutive effects.
Panel C of Table 1 indicates that stock option plans for which
all employees are eligible are met with significantly more no votes
than plans in which executives or outside directors are eligible.
However, the results in Table 3 are not consistent with this hy-
pothesis as none of the coefficients on ALLEMPLOYEES are signifi-
cant.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that proposals to add shares to exist-
ing plans are met with more opposition, on average, than are pro-
posals to adopt new plans, even if the new plans simply replace al-
ready existing plans. However, as we earlier noted, Panel C of Table
1 shows that average TOTALDIL for proposals to add shares is also
significantly greater than it is for proposals to adopt new plans. The
results of Table 3 show that the variable ADDSHARES is positive
and significantly related to AGAINST in all four regressions. Thus,
stockholders cast more no votes for proposals to add shares than
they do for proposals to adopt new plans. This result may occur be-
cause stockholders are not expecting the additional dilution that will
occur with adding shares to existing plans. In other words, when a
plan is originally adopted, stockholders form an expectation about
the potential dilution that can occur with the plan and vote accord-
ingly. However, later, when the firm wants to expand the number of
shares that can be issued in the plan, stockholders become con-
cerned about the amount of compensation being awarded to employ-
ees. This concern may precipitate a stronger negative vote.
With respect to the features of stock option plans, the regression
estimates of Table 3 show some similarities with the univariate re-
sults of Table 2. In particular, there is strong support for positive
and significant relationships between AGAINST and REPRICE,
RESTRICT, and LOANS. Stockholders strongly disapprove of the
practice of repricing underwater options, the ability to issue time
lapsing restricted stock, and the company's ability to loan money to
executives or employees to exercise options. Some support is shown
in the regressions for a positive and significant relationship between
AGAINST and EVERGREEN as well as DISCOUNT. Stockholders
do not approve of the practice of replenishing option coffers with ev-
ergreen provisions, nor do they approve of the inclusion of below the
money option awards. However, the multi-variance analysis does
not show any significant relationships between AGAINST and
OMNIBUS, RELOAD, CONTROL, PYRAMID, or ACCELERATE.
In Table 4, we replicate regression 1 of Table 3 with the addi-
tion of variables MARETlYR, MARET3YR, and MARET5YR, the
one, three, and five-year, respectively, market-adjusted stock re-
turns. The sign on all three variables is positive and significantly
related to AGAINST. One explanation for this result might be that,
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as firm performance worsens, stockholders desire to see managers'
and employees' interests become more aligned with their interests,
namely, to increase the value of the firm's stock price. Therefore, in
a cross-sectional regression, poorly performing firms receive more
votes in favor of their incentive compensation schemes. Many of the
other variables in Table 4 retain their sign and significance. The
exceptions occur when, as observations are dropped from the regres-
sion due to missing stock returns, ADDSHARES, EVERGREEN,
and DISCOUNT tend to lose their significance. Nevertheless, the
results on TOTALDIL, DILPROP, the interaction term, REPRICE,
and LOANS remain robust throughout both Tables 3 and 4.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
1. Technology Firms Versus Non-Technology Firms
We re-estimate regression 1 of Table 3 by separating out firms
that are classified as being in the technology sector from those that
are not in the technology sector. We do this because technology
firms tend to exhibit more widespread use of stock options than do
non-technology firms.22 Therefore, the determinants of voting be-
havior may differ between these two groups of firms. Though we do
not provide a table, the results indicate that dilution is important
regardless of sector classification. TOTALDIL, DILPROP, and the
interaction between TOTALDIL and DILPROP all have the same
sign as regression 1 of Table 3 and are all highly significant. In ad-
dition, REPRICE is positive and is also highly significant for both
groups of companies.
Some variables, however, do exhibit different statistical results
depending on sector classification. For example, ALLEMPLOYEES
is positive and significant for technology companies but is not sig-
nificant for non-technology firms. This result may reflect the wide-
spread use of options in technology firms, and investors' apparent
growing dislike of the practice. Several variables, EVERGREEN,
RESTRICT, and LOANS, are positive and significant for non-
technology firms, but they are not significant for technology compa-
nies. While we do not have a ready explanation for these results, we
simply note the difference in voting behavior between the two
groups of companies.
Finally, we note that DISCOUNT is negative and significant for
technology firms but is positive and significant for non-technology
firms. The result may reflect differences in competition in the mar-
kets for human capital that exist in the different sectors. Investors
of technology firms recognize that the competition for talent is
228. See Joann S. Lublin & Leslie Scism, Stock Options at Firms Irk Some
Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1999, at C1. Of the ten companies cited in the
Article, six of them were technology firms. See id.
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fierce. The ability to issue options at a discount is another way of
attracting and retaining valuable employees. If the option plan does
not allow for discount options, it could be damaging to a technology
firm's ability to compete. However, the competition for high level
talent may not be as intense for non-technology firms. Thus, inves-
tors of non-technology firms may view discount options as an unnec-
essary perk and increase their votes against stock option plans.
2. Effect of Management Ownership of Stock on Results
To test whether management stock ownership affects our re-
sults, we adjusted AGAINST for ownership by all officers and direc-
tors. Our assumption is that these shareholders would always vote
for the management stock option plan proposals. The adjustment
formula is as follows: AGAINST / (100.0 - OFFDIR), where OFFDIR
is the percentage ownership of all officers and directors. Of the 605
observations with ownership data, the average adjusted AGAINST
is 20.9%, whereas the unadjusted AGAINST is 18.8%. The Pearson
correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.97.
We then re-estimated regression 1 of Table 3. The results are
very similar to those reported in Table 3, except that DISCOUNT is
now significant and RESTRICT is not. We conclude that manage-
ment stock ownership levels do not significantly affect our results.
3. Caveats
There are two additional tests that we would have run if we had
the data available to do so. First, our data set contains only one
year of cross-sectional information, which means that we are unable
to follow stockholder voting on stock option plans over time. Ideally,
we would like to see how voting patterns change over a period of
several years to determine how stable our results are.
Second, we lack data in our sample on institutional investor
stock ownership at individual companies. If institutions are more
informed voters and act according to set voting policies, it would be
interesting to see if they react differently than other investors to
management proposals. We would anticipate that companies with
higher levels of institutional stock ownership would experience
higher levels of opposition to their plans. Unfortunately, we are un-
able to test this hypothesis with the data that we have available.
CONCLUSION
This Article represents only the first step in understanding the
interaction between boards and shareholders over stock option
plans. Its principal finding is that, while shareholders generally
vote to approve stock option plans, they are sensitive to several as-
pects of stock option plans' design and their effect on the sharehold-
ers' stake in the company. Dilution, measured in terms of total
company dilution or of individual plan dilution, emerges consistently
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as a critical factor in how shareholders vote on stock option plans.
This result suggests that shareholders are concerned about the rela-
tive costs and benefits of stock option plans. While the benefits of
stock option plans as a form of performance incentive, and as a
method of aligning management and shareholder interests, have
been subject to exhaustive research by finance and legal scholars,
little work has been done on their costs. We view this as an impor-
tant area for further exploration.
Plan design is another important determinant of shareholder
opposition. Several key features of management proposals appear to
provoke strong responses from shareholders. Option repricings,
payments in restricted stock, and the provision of loans to execu-
tives for the purchase of shares appear to be the most significant
factors leading to increased shareholder opposition. We also find an
increase in the level of negative votes when plans contain evergreen
features or offer executives discount options. Boards of directors
should reconsider whether they should propose plans that contain
these features or at least offer shareholders stronger evidence that
these features are in their best interests. In our future work, we in-
tend to examine how boards respond to shareholder opposition to
their stock option plan proposals.
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Average Vote Against Management Sponsored Stock Option Proposals
by Total Dilution, Proposal Dilution, and Eligibility for Plans
Based on Proposals During 1998 Proxy Season
Panel A: Average AGAINST by measures of dilution
DILPROP < 5% DILPROP > 5%
N AGAINST N AGAINST t-statistic
TOTALDIL < 10.00% 132 11.7% 16 9.2% 0.93
TOTALDIL > 10.00% 304 18.3% 185 24.8% 5.07***
t-statistic 5.85*** 6.55***
Panel B: Average AGAINST and dilution by whether plan is adoption of new plan or addition of shares to
existing plan
N AGAINST TOTALDIL DILPROP
Adopt new plan 348 16.6% 15.3% 4.9%
Add shares to existing plan 289 21.0% 17.8% 4.3%
t-statistic (Adopt vs. Add shares) -4.21*** -3.67*** 1.81
Panel C: Average AGAINST and dilution by participant eligibility
N AGAINST TOTALDIL DILPROP
All employees 268 22.1% 18.1% 5.7%
Executives 251 18.1% 15.2% 5.3%
Outside directors 118 11.9% 15.1% 0.6%
t-statistic (All employees vs. Executives) 3.41*** 3.65*** 0.99
t-statistic (All employees vs. Outside directors) 8.27*** 3.13"** 17.7"**
t-statistic (Executives vs. Outside directors) 5.28*** 0.07 19.8*.*
Panel D: Average vote against proposals by stock market return
N AGAINST TOTALDIL DILPROP
MARETlYR < -6.74% 208 17.8% 15.5% 4.0%
MARET1YR > -6.74% 207 18.1% 15.7% 4.9%
t-statistic for difference in MARETIYR 0.78 0.15 2.58**
MARET3YR < -1.87% 202 16.1% 14.4% 4.0%
MARET3YR > -1.87% 202 19.5% 16.7% 4.9%
t-statistic for difference in MARETYR 2.63*** 2.64*** 2.49**
MARET5YR < -1.55% 186 16.1% 14.5% 4.3%
MARET5YR > -1.55% 186 19.1% 16.4% 4.5%
t-statistic for difference in MARET5YR 2.23** 2.05** 0.51
***, -* Statistically significant at the .01 and .05 level
Definitions:
AGAINST: Percent of shares voted that are cast against management-sponsored stock option proposals,
including abstentions.
DILPROP: Shares reserved for stock options based on each proposal divided by the total number of voting
securities.
TOTALDIL: All shares reserved for stock options or granted as stock options divided by the total number
of voting securities.
MARETIYR = Market-adjusted return 1 year = Company stock return over previous fiscal year minus
Average return on S&P 1500 firms for same period.
NARAIZT3YR = Market-adjusted return 3 year = Company stock return over previous three fiscal years
minus Average return on S&P 1500 firms for same period.
MARET5YR = Market-adjusted return 5 year = Company stock return over previous five fiscal years
minus Average return on S&P 1500 firms for same period.
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Table 2
Average Votes Against Management-Sponsored Stock Option Plans by Various Plan Features
Based on Proposals During 1998 Proxy Season
Plans Plans t-statistic
Plan Feature With Feature Without Feature With vs. Without Feature
Evergreen provision 28.2% 18.0% 3.77* *
or Quasi-evergreen provision (36) (601)
Discount options 24.2% 16.6% 5.97***
(169) (468)
Reprice underwater options 25.1% 16.1% 7.71***
(179) (458)
Omnibus awards 21.1% 17.1% 3.64***
(241) (396)
Time lapsing restricted stock 20.8% 16.9% 3.74***
(281) (356)
Reload option 20.4% 18A% 1.10
(63) (574)
Change in control provision 19.7% 14.9% 4.07***
(493) (144)
Pyramiding allowed to pay exercise price 18.7% 18.4% 0.30
(412) (225)
Loans given to pay exercise price 24.8% 16.4% 7.32***
(169) (468)
Accelerate vesting time for options 21.2% 15.7% 5.40***
(339) (298)
• Statistically significant at the .01 level.
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Table 3
Regression Coefficients of Voting Results on Dilution and Features of Stock Option Plans
1998 Proxy Season
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: AGAINST
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.52 -1.54 -0.58 -1.53
(-0.34) (-0.63) (-0.37) (-0.62)
TOTALDIL 0.62 0.62
(9.38***) (9.21"**)
TOTALDIL<10% 0.75 0.75
(2.87***) (2.77"**)
TOTALDIL>10% 0.60 0.60
(7.46***) (7.45***)
DILPROP 0.77 0.74
(3.67***) (3.45***)
DILPROP<5% 0.81 0.77
(2.74***) (2.49"*)
DILPROP>5% 0.71 0.71(2.14"*) (2.14"*)
TOTALDIL x DILPROP -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-3.86***) (-3.49***) (-3.00***) (-2.87***)
ALLEMPLOYEES 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.41
(1.50) (1.52) (1.43) (1.46)
ADDSHARES 2.20 2.17 2.18 2.16
(2.38**) (2.35**) (2.35**) (2.33**)
EVERGREEN 3.87 3.90 3.94 3.94
(1.91) (1.92) (1.92) (1.92)
DISCOUNT 1.83 1.86 1.81 1.85
(1.69) (1.71) (1.67) (1.69)
REPRICE 4.62 4.68 4.63 4.68(4.10"**) (4.13"**) (4.10"**) (4.13"** )
OMNIBUS 1.55 1.58 1.55 1.58(1.19) (1.21) (1.19) (1.21)
RESTRICT 2.54 2.51 2.51 2.49
(2.09**) (2.06**) (2.05**) (2.04**)
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Table 3, continued
Regression Coefficients of Voting Results on Dilution and Features of Stock Option Plans
Dependent Variable: AGAINST
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
RELOAD -0.67 -0.72 -0.69 -0.73
(-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.47)
CONTROL 1.46 1.43 1.46 1.44
(1.34) (1.32) (1.34) (1.32)
PYRAMID -0.29 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
(-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.32)
LOANS 2.66 2.64 2.64 2.63
(2.45**) (2.44**) (2.43**) (2.42**)
ACCELERATE 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57
(0.59) (0.58) (0.56) (0.56)
Number of observations 637 637 637 637
Adjusted R2  0.3314 0.3306 0.3304 0.3296
F-statistic 22.015 20.633 20.610 19.389
(p-value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
***, ** Statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
See Table 1 for the definitions of AGAINST, TOTALDIL, and DILPROP
TOTALDIL<10% = TOTALDIL if TOTALDIL < 10%
= 10% ifTOTALDIL> 10%
TOTALDIL>10% = 0 if TOTALDIL < 10%
= TOTALDIL- 10% if TOTALDIL 2:10%
DILPROP<5% = DILPROP if DILPROP < 5%
= 5% if DILPROP> 5%
DILPROP>5% = 0 if DILPROP < 5%
= DILPROP - 5% if DILPROP >5%
ALLEMPLOYEES = I if all employees are eligible to receive options, 0 if only executives or outside
directors are eligible.
ADDSHARES = I if proposal is to add shares to existing plan, 0 if proposal is to adopt new plan.
EVERGREEN = I if plan has an evergreen or quasi-evergreen provision, 0 otherwise.
DISCOUNT = I if company can award discounted options, 0 otherwise.
REPRICE = 1 if company can re-price underwater options, 0 otherwise.
OMNIBUS = I if plan includes more than five types of awards, 0 otherwise.
RESTRICT = I if time lapsing restricted stock is included in the plan, 0 otherwise.
RELOAD = I if plan contains a reload option, 0 otherwise.
CONTROL = I if plan contains a change in control provision, 0 otherwise.
PYRAMID = 1 if pyramiding is allowed to pay exercise price, 0 otherwise.
LOANS = I if company gives loans to participants to pay exercise price, 0 otherwise.
ACCELERATE = I if company can accelerate the vesting time for options, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4
Regression Coefficients of Voting Results on Dilution, Features of Stock Option Plans,
and Firm Performance
1998 Proxy Season
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: AGAINST
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -2.17 -1.92 -1.71
(-1.03) (-0.91) (-0.82)
TOTALDIL 0.70 0.69 0.73
(7.18"**) (7.17***) (7.65***)
DILPROP 1.14 1.12 1.05(3,43**) (3.39***) (3.20***)
TOTALDIL x DILPROP -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(-3.35***) (-3.22***) (-3.01***)
ALLEMPLOYEES 0.83 0.27 0.21
(0.48) (0.23) (0.18)
ADDSHARES 2.42 2.20 1.32
(2.09**) (1.90) (1.12)
EVERGREEN 4.48 3.66 1.08
(1.81) (1.49) (0.45)
DISCOUNT 2.56 2.92 2.11
(1.87) (2.12"*) (1.51)
REPRICE 5.36 4.58 5.31
(3.82***) (3.25***) (3.70***)
OMNIBUS 0.75 0.77 1.88
(0.48) (0.48) (1.17)
RESTRICT 2.45 2.39 2.01
(1.65) (1.59) (1.33)
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Table 4, continued
Regression Coefficients of Voting Results on Dilution, Features of Stock Option Plans,
and Firm Performance
Dependent Variable: AGAINST
Variable (1) (2) (3)
RELOAD -1.12 -1.67 -2.36
(-0.60) (-0.88) (-1.24)
CONTROL 1.28 1.34 0.67
(0.93) (0.99) (0.49)
PYRAMID -0.23 -0.17 0.32
(-0.19) (-0.14) (0.28)
LOANS 3.38 3.60 3.74
(2.42**) (2.54**) (2.65***)
ACCELERATE 1.97 2.10 1.42
(1.60) (1.71) (1.16)
MARET1YR 0.02
(2.16**)
MARET3YR 0.07
(3.33***)
MARET5YR 0.07
(2.28**)
Number of observations 415 404 372
Adjusted R2  0.3228 0.3265 0.3445
F-statistic 13.335 13.209 13,188
(p-value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
***, ** Statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
See Tables 1 and 3 for all variable definitions.
20001 SHAREHOLDER VOTING 81
00
:jC~
-- 
fil
Q--J 
i
c-Ja.
0C L 
t0
-i c;o M
-5 IL 
-
0
CC
o +
co
-J
<-C) 
I-I-~
n 
0 
0 CD
I.-N I-
.LSNIV!Z)

